Chapter 1

The Return on Lobbying

Abstract

Lobbying disclosures are the primary record of what interests spend. The Lobbying Disclosure Act database reports spending filing by filing, and a national total requires summing the filings. The best-documented case is the 2004 repatriation tax holiday. A Republican-controlled Congress passed it with votes from both parties. A coalition that registered through PricewaterhouseCoopers reported $700,000 in lobbying income for 2003 and $620,000 on its 2004 mid-year report, and the coalition's lobbyists included former Representative Bill Archer. CRS and a Journal of Finance study find no increase in domestic investment or employment among repatriating firms, including firms that lobbied. A Democratic majority-staff report of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations counts a net loss of 20,931 jobs at the top 15 repatriators, and one law-review study puts the return at more than $220 per $1 spent on lobbying. Other studies find positive returns in other samples. Ansolabehere and coauthors, Baumgartner and coauthors, and Hall and Deardorff supply the strongest counter-arguments, and each is reported beside the claim it limits. The Dodd-Frank cases come from a Democratic-era statute. The cited record does not establish lobbying returns for the 2017 tax act, the Affordable Care Act or Medicare Part D.

1.1 What the disclosure record counts

Finding POL-1.1Open question

The Lobbying Disclosure Act database returned 14,922 mid-year filings for 2004, 16,046 mid-year and 16,406 year-end filings for 2005, and 18,107 first-quarter filings for 2023. These are counts of filings and carry no dollar amounts.

The Lobbying Disclosure Act database at lda.gov is the primary record of registered lobbying spending. Outside lobbying firms report income from each client, and organizations that lobby for themselves report expenses. A national total for a year requires summing those fields across original filings and excluding amendments.

Evidence: Exhibit 678

§1.1.1

The counts above come from the interface's count field. They are numbers of filings and carry no dollar amounts.

§1.1.2

Third-party tallies of annual lobbying totals exist. The database's registrant-income and in-house-expense fields, summed across original filings, are the primary basis for any such total.

Exhibit 678 · Dataset query

Lobbying Disclosure Act API: filing counts by year and type

Count field read from the lda.gov API on 2026-11-10: filing_year 2004 type MM 14,922; 2005 MM 16,046 and YY 16,406; 2023 Q1 18,107 (originals, per type). Anonymous access is throttled (HTTP 429, about 15 requests a minute), and the older soprweb.senate.gov quarterly zips did not respond. National dollar totals by year were not derived.

Source: U.S. Congress (Lobbying Disclosure Act database, lda.gov)
Date: 2026-11-10
Grade: Reported
Document: https://lda.gov/api/v1/filings/
Accessed: 2026-11-10
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

1.2 The 2004 provision and its vote

Finding POL-1.2Primary record

The 2004 repatriation provision taxed repatriated foreign dividends at an effective rate of 5.25 percent, and corporations repatriated $312 billion under it.

The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 allowed an 85 percent deduction for dividends repatriated from foreign subsidiaries, which produced an effective rate of 5.25 percent. The Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI) counts 840 corporations that repatriated under it.

Evidence: Exhibit 674, Exhibit 675

Mechanism: Lobbying and purchased policy

§1.2.1

CRS (Marples and Gravelle, report R40178) describes the deduction and the rate. PSI states the $312 billion total on page 1 of its report. The Joint Committee on Taxation scored the ten-year net revenue loss at $3.3 billion, because about $100 billion of dividends would have returned anyway at the 35 percent rate (PSI, footnote 2). The scoring and the gross rate reduction measure different things, and the figures in section 1.5 depend on which one is used. PSI also reports that some who dispute the Joint Committee figure say the provision raised $16.4 billion. The report does not say who made that claim.

§1.2.2

The Dharmapala working paper's legislative background records a second pressure on Congress: the repeal of an export subsidy after a World Trade Organization ruling created demand for an offsetting corporate tax measure. The provision therefore had a policy rationale beyond the lobbying campaign described below.

Exhibit 674 · Subcommittee report

Repatriating Offshore Funds: 2004 Tax Windfall for Select Multinationals

After repatriating over $150 billion under the 2004 American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA), the top 15 repatriating corporations reduced their overall U.S. workforce by 20,931 jobs, while broad-based studies of all 840 repatriating corporations found no evidence that repatriated funds increased overall U.S. employment.

Majority staff report on a survey of 19 to 20 repatriating corporations. Reports $312 billion repatriated at an effective 5.25 percent rate, a JCT revenue-loss estimate of $3.3 billion over ten years (about $100 billion would have returned anyway), net U.S. job losses at the top 15 repatriators, buybacks up 16 and 38 percent, and executive pay up 27 and 30 percent. Majority-staff (Democratic) authorship: findings on policy are one party's; the printed survey figures come from company responses. Local copy sha256 13ce026e18df1a9f75950430942b6f3f52a8fc3493b68c606daabbc7d0d27639.

Source: U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (majority staff)
Date: 11 October 2011
Quoted from: Report Findings, item 1 (report p. 5)
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/RepatriatingOffshoreFundsReportOct202011wExhibitsFINAL.pdf
Accessed: 2026-11-10
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

Exhibit 675 · CRS report

Tax Cuts on Repatriation Earnings as Economic Stimulus: An Economic Analysis (R40178, 21 December 2012 version)

While empirical evidence is clear that this provision resulted in a significant increase in repatriated earnings, empirical evidence is unable to show a corresponding increase in domestic investment or employment.

Describes the 85 percent deduction (5.25 percent effective rate) and surveys empirical studies: repatriations rose sharply but did not raise investment or employment, and much went to stock repurchases. Notes Faulkender and Petersen found investment effects at capital-constrained firms (about 20 percent of repatriations), an industry-commissioned Sinai simulation of 614,000 jobs for a 2009 holiday, and that fungibility means buybacks may not violate the law.

Source: Congressional Research Service (Marples and Gravelle)
Date: 21 December 2012
Quoted from: Summary, second paragraph
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20121221_R40178_32bec8a2b17deaf51debbd5755e2bf89790c1f5c.html
Accessed: 2026-11-10
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

Finding POL-1.3Primary record

The 2004 American Jobs Creation Act conference report passed the House 280 to 141 and the Senate 69 to 17, with yea votes from Republicans and Democrats in both chambers.

The table gives the votes by party. Republicans held the majority in both chambers in 2004. The conference report drew yea votes from members of both parties, and the largest share of nay votes came from House Democrats.

Evidence: Exhibit 686, Exhibit 687

Votes on the conference report for H.R. 4520, October 2004
Chamber and date	Republicans yea / nay	Democrats yea / nay	Total yea / nay
House, 7 October (roll call 509)	207 / 16	73 / 124	280 / 141
Senate, 11 October (vote 211)	43 / 3	25 / 14	69 / 17

§1.2.3

The House total includes four Republicans and eight Democrats not voting. The Senate count includes one Independent yea. A majority of House Democrats voted no, and a majority of Senate Democrats voted yes. The party counts were derived from the Clerk's and the Senate's roll-call records.

Exhibit 686 · Roll call vote

House roll call 509, American Jobs Creation Act conference report, 7 October 2004

Agreed 280 to 141. Republicans 207 yea, 16 nay, 4 not voting; Democrats 73 yea, 124 nay, 8 not voting.

Source: U.S. House of Representatives (Clerk)
Date: 7 October 2004
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://clerk.house.gov/evs/2004/roll509
Accessed: 2026-11-10
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

Exhibit 687 · Roll call vote

Senate roll call vote 211, H.R. 4520 conference report (American Jobs Creation Act), 11 October 2004

Agreed 69 to 17. Counted from the vote XML: Republicans 43 yea, 3 nay; Democrats 25 yea, 14 nay; one Independent yea.

Source: U.S. Senate
Date: 11 October 2004
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1082/vote_108_2_00211.htm
Accessed: 2026-11-10
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

1.3 The Homeland Investment Coalition

Finding POL-1.4Primary record

The Homeland Investment Coalition registered through PricewaterhouseCoopers on 14 February 2003. The filings report $700,000 in lobbying income for 2003 and $620,000 on the 2004 mid-year report.

PricewaterhouseCoopers was the registrant. Eight filings under client number 114561 list the issue as "Taxation/Internal Revenue Code." They list the House, the Senate, the Treasury and the Executive Office of the President as contacts.

Evidence: Exhibit 677

Mechanism: Lobbying and purchased policy

§1.3.1

The 2004 coalition was named the Homeland Investment Coalition (HIC). Dharmapala, Foley and Forbes define it as "a group of firms and organizations formed with the sole purpose of lobbying to reduce the tax rate on U.S. repatriations." The WIN America campaign of 2011 was a later effort. The cited filings do not list the coalition's member firms.

Filings by PricewaterhouseCoopers for the Homeland Investment Coalition, 2003 to 2006
Filing	Posted	Income reported
Registration	14 February 2003	none stated
2003 mid-year	13 August 2003	$360,000
2003 year-end	24 February 2004	$340,000
2004 mid-year	25 August 2004	$620,000
2004 year-end	25 February 2005	$0.00
2005 mid-year	17 August 2005	$80,000
2005 year-end	7 February 2006	$160,000
2006 termination	2 August 2006	$0.00

§1.3.2

The 2004 mid-year filing lists $620,000 and a lobbyist group that differs from every other filing in the series. The 2004 year-end filing lists $0.00. The table gives the filed figures by report, and they are not added into a coalition total.

§1.3.3

A filing records income paid to the registrant. It shows what the client paid PricewaterhouseCoopers for lobbying services and does not show how any individual firm's contribution was divided. The filings alone do not establish what the coalition's lobbying changed.

Exhibit 677 · Lobbying disclosure filings

Lobbying Disclosure Act filings: Homeland Investment Coalition, 2003 to 2006

Eight filings by registrant PricewaterhouseCoopers for client Homeland Investment Coalition (client id 114561): registration 2003-02-14; 2003 mid-year $360,000 and year-end $340,000; 2004 mid-year $620,000 and year-end $0.00; 2005 mid-year $80,000 and year-end $160,000; 2006 termination $0.00. Issue: Taxation/Internal Revenue Code. Lobbyists include Bill Archer (covered position 'HOUSE MEMBER' on the registration), Oren Penn ('LEG COUNSEL/JT TAX COMM'), Bernard Shapiro and Alan Fischl. Contacts: House, Senate, Treasury, Executive Office of the President. Sums are the project's; the 2004 mid-year filing lists a different lobbyist group and the year-end shows 0.00.

Source: U.S. Congress (Lobbying Disclosure Act database, lda.gov), filed by PricewaterhouseCoopers
Date: 2003 to 2006
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://lda.gov/api/v1/filings/?client_name=homeland+investment+coalition
Accessed: 2026-11-10
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit
Note: Filing documents at lda.gov/filings/public/filing/<uuid>/print/ should be read to confirm the 2004 reporting period.

Finding POL-1.5Primary record

The 2003 registration of the Homeland Investment Coalition lists Bill Archer as a lobbyist, with the covered position "HOUSE MEMBER."

The registration lists former Representative Bill Archer among six lobbyists, and Donald Carlson with the covered position "COS/REP ARCHER." Later filings list Archer with no covered position.

Evidence: Exhibit 677

Mechanism: The revolving door

§1.3.4

Archer represented a Texas district as a Republican and left the House in 2001. The service dates are from secondary sources. His name appears on the coalition's 2003 and 2005 filings and on the 2004 year-end filing, and does not appear on the 2004 mid-year filing. A second filer, Oren Penn, is listed with the covered position "LEG COUNSEL/JT TAX COMM" on the 2004 and 2005 filings.

§1.3.5

The cited record documents one move from the House to this coalition, by a Republican, and no Democratic counterpart for this provision.

1.4 What the firms did with the money

Finding POL-1.6Peer-reviewed

Firms that repatriated under the 2004 provision did not increase domestic investment, employment or research and development, including the firms that lobbied for it.

Dharmapala, Foley and Forbes use instruments for firms likely to gain most from the holiday. CRS states: "While empirical evidence is clear that this provision resulted in a significant increase in repatriated earnings, empirical evidence is unable to show a corresponding increase in domestic investment or employment."

Evidence: Exhibit 676, Exhibit 675

Mechanism: Lobbying and purchased policy

§1.4.1

The Dharmapala working paper (NBER 15023, June 2009; Journal of Finance 66(3), 2011) states that repatriations "did not lead to an increase in domestic investment, employment or R&D" for firms that lobbied for the holiday "stating these intentions." It cites a letter from the coalition to House Ways and Means Chairman Bill Thomas dated 21 March 2003 in its footnote 26. The footnote is the source for the letter's content.

The official position

Firms and the coalition said in 2003 that a repatriation holiday would raise domestic investment, research and development, and job creation. An industry-commissioned simulation by Sinai projected 614,000 jobs from a 2009 holiday.

What the record shows

CRS finds empirical evidence unable to show a gain in domestic investment or employment from the 2004 provision. Faulkender and Petersen, as CRS reports them, found an investment effect at capital-constrained firms, with about 20 percent of repatriated funds spent on investment.

§1.4.2

The same CRS report names the strongest proponent evidence, and the Faulkender and Petersen result belongs to the record. CRS summarizes the Dharmapala and the Clemons and Kinney findings as showing that these provisions are "an ineffective means of increasing economic growth." Four chief financial officers opposed a new holiday at a House Ways and Means hearing in May 2011, according to CRS.

Exhibit 676 · Working paper (published JoF 2011)

Watch What I Do, Not What I Say: The Unintended Consequences of the Homeland Investment Act

Repatriations did not lead to an increase in domestic investment, employment or R&D—even for the firms that lobbied for the tax holiday stating these intentions and for firms that appeared to be financially constrained.

Uses instruments for firms likely to gain most from the holiday. Finds no increase in domestic investment, employment or R&D, including at firms in the Homeland Investment Coalition and firms whose PACs gave to tax-writing committee members. Working paper reports almost $1 of shareholder payouts per $1 repatriated; the published abstract is reported by PSI as 60 to 92 cents. Defines the HIC as 'a group of firms and organizations formed with the sole purpose of lobbying to reduce the tax rate on U.S. repatriations' and cites its 21 March 2003 letter to Chairman Bill Thomas (fn. 26; letter not found).

Source: Dharmapala, Foley and Forbes (NBER Working Paper 15023, June 2009; Journal of Finance 66(3):753-787, 2011)
Date: June 2009
Quoted from: Abstract (working paper version)
Grade: Peer-reviewed
Document: https://www.nber.org/papers/w15023
Accessed: 2026-11-10
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

Finding POL-1.7Primary record

CRS reports that studies generally find the repatriated funds went to shareholders through stock repurchases. Dharmapala, Foley and Forbes estimate $0.91 of repurchases per $1 repatriated in their working paper.

CRS surveys the empirical studies of the 2004 provision and cites the Dharmapala, Foley and Forbes working paper for the $0.91 figure. It states the fungibility caveat quoted in paragraph 1.4.4.

Evidence: Exhibit 675, Exhibit 674

Mechanism: Lobbying and purchased policy

§1.4.3

PSI reports the published version's estimate as 60 to 92 cents per dollar. The working paper gives $0.91, and the published version differs.

§1.4.4

The provision barred repurchases and executive pay as uses of the funds. CRS states that "because of the fungibility of money, firms that use part of the repatriation to repurchase shares may not violate the law." Money brought home for a permitted purpose freed other cash for repurchases, and the cited documents do not trace a repatriated dollar to a repurchase.

Finding POL-1.8Primary record

A Democratic majority-staff report of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations found that the top 15 repatriating corporations cut a net 20,931 U.S. jobs from 2004 to 2007 and raised stock buybacks 16 percent from 2004 to 2005 and 38 percent from 2005 to 2006.

The report is a document of the subcommittee's Democratic majority staff under Chairman Carl Levin, issued on 11 October 2011. Its survey covered 19 to 20 repatriating corporations. It also counts executive compensation increases of 27 percent and 30 percent.

Evidence: Exhibit 674

Mechanism: Lobbying and purchased policy

§1.4.5

The printed figures come from company survey responses. One surveyed firm wrote that it was difficult to point to a direct connection between repatriation and jobs, and another kept no data on U.S. jobs or research spending. PSI reports no firm admission that repatriated funds paid for buybacks.

§1.4.6

The policy conclusions in the report belong to one party's staff. The job and employment findings do not depend on that source alone, because CRS and the peer-reviewed study reach the same result on investment and employment from independent data. The 20,931 figure and the buyback and pay increases rest on PSI alone in the cited record.

1.5 The $220 return estimate

Finding POL-1.9Peer-reviewed

Alexander, Mazza and Scholz report that firms lobbying for the 2004 repatriation provision had a return in excess of $220 for every $1 spent on lobbying.

The abstract states: "We find firms lobbying for this provision have a return in excess of $220 for every $1 spent on lobbying, or 22,000%." The University of Kansas release reports 843 repatriating firms and $312 billion. It describes a sample of 476 publicly traded firms that repatriated more than $298 billion.

Evidence: Exhibit 679, Exhibit 680

Mechanism: Lobbying and purchased policy

§1.5.1

Alexander, Mazza and Scholz's abstract states that they used audited tax disclosures. They report that profitability and cash on hand do not predict how much a firm repatriated and that industry and firm size do. The release cites Eli Lilly's $8.52 million in lobbying in 2003 and 2004 for the provision.

The official position

The study reports a return above $220 per $1 on lobbying for the provision, or 22,000 percent.

What the record shows

The ratio compares gross tax savings from the lower rate with lobbying spending, and it does not state that lobbying caused the provision. Firms with large offshore cash and high tax rates gain most from a holiday and are also the firms most likely to lobby. Joint Committee scoring puts the net revenue loss at $3.3 billion over ten years. The 22,000 percent figure describes one provision and one sample.

§1.5.2

The study addresses selection in part, since its own tests find profitability and cash on hand do not predict repatriation. Dharmapala, Foley and Forbes address it with instruments for the firms likely to gain most. Each approach leaves the coalition's spending and the export-subsidy repeal described in section 1.2 entangled.

Exhibit 679 · Journal article

Measuring Rates of Return for Lobbying Expenditures: An Empirical Case Study of Tax Breaks for Multinational Corporations

We find firms lobbying for this provision have a return in excess of $220 for every $1 spent on lobbying, or 22,000%.

Uses audited tax disclosures on the 2004 repatriation holiday. Abstract also reports that profitability does not predict repatriation amount, that industry and firm size do, and that cash on hand does not. The abstract does not give the paper's sample, dollar totals or method.

Source: Alexander, Mazza and Scholz, Journal of Law and Politics 25:401
Date: 2009
Quoted from: Abstract (KU ScholarWorks record)
Grade: Peer-reviewed
Document: https://hdl.handle.net/1808/11410
Accessed: 2026-11-10
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

Exhibit 680 · University press release

Tax lobbying provides 22,000 percent return to multinational firms, KU researchers find

University of Kansas release of 9 April 2009, read in the phys.org copy. States that 843 firms repatriated over $312 billion; that the researchers examined 476 publicly traded firms that repatriated more than $298 billion; that Eli Lilly disclosed $8.52 million in lobbying in 2003 and 2004 for the provision; and that for each dollar spent on lobbying a corporation received $220 in U.S. income tax savings, a 22,000 percent average return.

Source: University of Kansas (press release, copy on phys.org)
Date: 9 April 2009
Grade: Reported
Document: https://phys.org/news/2009-04-tax-lobbying-percent-multinational-firms.amp
Accessed: 2026-11-10
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

1.6 Studies of other samples

Finding POL-1.10Peer-reviewed

Peer-reviewed studies of other samples find positive associations between lobbying and outcomes: lower effective tax rates (Richter et al.), more earmarks for universities with an appropriations committee member (de Figueiredo and Silverman), and better financial performance (Chen et al.).

The three studies use different data. Richter, Samphantharak and Timmons use all U.S. firms with public financial statements. Chen, Parsley and Yang use Lobbying Disclosure Act data. De Figueiredo and Silverman study university earmarks.

Evidence: Exhibit 681, Exhibit 683, Exhibit 682

Mechanism: Lobbying and purchased policy

§1.6.1

Richter and coauthors write that "increasing registered lobbying expenditures by 1% appears to lower effective tax rates by somewhere in the range of 0.5 to 1.6 percentage points for the average firm that lobbies." They also state that the costs of lobbying-induced tax breaks appear modest for the government.

§1.6.2

De Figueiredo and Silverman write that "for universities with HAC or SAC representation, a 10 percent increase in lobbying yields an additional 2.8 percent or 3.5 percent increase in earmarks, respectively." Universities without an appropriations committee member see little or no return, so the return depends on the lobbied institution's access.

§1.6.3

Chen and coauthors write: "We find that, on average, lobbying is positively related to accounting and market measures of financial performance." Their stated challenge is reverse causality, since firms may lobby because they are doing well, and a Vanderbilt summary quotes Parsley to that effect. According to secondary summaries, Hill, Kelly, Lockhart and Van Ness (Financial Management, 2013) test for omitted-variable and self-selection bias.

Exhibit 681 · Journal article

Lobbying and Taxes

Increasing registered lobbying expenditures by 1% appears to lower effective tax rates by somewhere in the range of 0.5 to 1.6 percentage points for the average firm that lobbies.

Uses all U.S. firms with public financial statements; also states that costs of lobbying-induced tax breaks appear modest for the government.

Source: Richter, Samphantharak and Timmons, American Journal of Political Science 53(4):893-909
Date: 2009
Quoted from: Abstract
Grade: Peer-reviewed
Document: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00407.x
Accessed: 2026-11-10
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

Exhibit 683 · Journal article

Academic Earmarks and the Returns to Lobbying

However, for universities with HAC or SAC representation, a 10 percent increase in lobbying yields an additional 2.8 percent or 3.5 percent increase in earmarks, respectively.

Estimates returns to university lobbying for earmarks; little or no return for universities without a House or Senate Appropriations Committee member.

Source: de Figueiredo and Silverman, Journal of Law and Economics 49(2):597-625
Date: 2006
Quoted from: Abstract
Grade: Peer-reviewed
Document: https://doi.org/10.1086/508248
Accessed: 2026-11-10
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

Exhibit 682 · Journal article

Corporate Lobbying and Firm Performance

We find that, on average, lobbying is positively related to accounting and market measures of financial performance.

Uses Lobbying Disclosure Act data; portfolios with the highest lobbying intensity outperform benchmarks in the three following years.

Source: Chen, Parsley and Yang, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 42(3-4):444-481
Date: 2015
Quoted from: Abstract
Grade: Peer-reviewed
Document: https://doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.12109
Accessed: 2026-11-10
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

Finding POL-1.11Peer-reviewed

Libgober finds that, in Federal Reserve rulemaking under Dodd-Frank, meetings with the Board and written comments were associated with abnormal stock returns in the tens of billions, and meetings were worth more.

Libgober's event study follows firm stock prices after Federal Reserve Board rule announcements under Dodd-Frank, an Obama-era statute. His comparison is between firms that met with the Board and their most similar competitors.

Evidence: Exhibit 684

Mechanism: Lobbying and purchased policy

§1.6.4

The abstract states: "I find that meetings and comments were associated with abnormal returns in the tens of billions, yet meetings were worth more." The comparison to similar competitors is the stricter of the chapter's selection tests, and the abstract reports that meetings are the channel that holds up under it.

§1.6.5

The study documents returns to the firms the Board heard and does not test what the Board would have decided without the meetings or whether the meetings changed any rule.

Exhibit 684 · Journal article

Meetings, Comments, and the Distributive Politics of Rulemaking

I find that meetings and comments were associated with abnormal returns in the tens of billions, yet meetings were worth more.

Event study of firm stock prices after Federal Reserve Board rule announcements under Dodd-Frank (Obama-era statute).

Source: Libgober, Quarterly Journal of Political Science 15(4):449-481
Date: 2020
Quoted from: Abstract
Grade: Peer-reviewed
Document: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00018135
Accessed: 2026-11-10
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

Finding POL-1.12Primary record

On 24 May 2010 the Senate voted 60 to 30 on a motion by Senator Brownback to instruct conferees to exempt motor vehicle dealers from the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Yea votes came from both parties.

The motion concerned the financial regulation bill, H.R. 4173. According to the exhibit summary, the enacted exemption is section 1029 of Pub. L. 111-203.

Evidence: Exhibit 685

§1.6.6

Senator Brownback argued on the floor that "there is not a single auto dealer on Wall Street--none of them, not one." The Congressional Record shows Senator Dodd opposing the motion. The yea votes included both Democratic and Republican senators, and the cited record does not give the party breakdown of the 60.

§1.6.7

The cited record documents a floor argument and a vote. It contains no lobbying filing by dealers or their association. According to trade press, the Army Secretary and the Military Coalition opposed the exemption.

Exhibit 685 · Congressional Record

Congressional Record, Senate, 24 May 2010: motion to instruct conferees on H.R. 4173 (auto dealers), roll call vote 163

There is not a single auto dealer on Wall Street--none of them, not one.

Debate and vote on Sen. Brownback's motion to instruct conferees to exempt motor vehicle dealers from the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau; Sen. Dodd opposed. Roll call 163: 60 yeas, 30 nays; the yeas list includes Democratic and Republican Senators. The enacted exemption is section 1029 of Pub.

Source: U.S. Senate (Congressional Record vol. 156, no. 79)
Date: 24 May 2010
Quoted from: S4130 (Brownback)
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CREC-2010-05-24/html/CREC-2010-05-24-pt1-PgS4130-2.htm
Accessed: 2026-11-10
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

1.7 The counter-literature

Finding POL-1.13Peer-reviewed

Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo and Snyder conclude that campaign contributions are a form of political participation and consumption, and that little relationship exists between contributions and votes once unobserved effects are controlled. The paper covers contributions and does not measure lobbying expenditures.

The authors argue "that campaign contributions are not a form of policy-buying, but are rather a form of political participation and consumption." Their closing sentence frames the puzzle: "the question is not why there is so little money politics, but rather why organized interests give at all."

Evidence: Exhibit 688

Mechanism: Lobbying and purchased policy

§1.7.1

The paper (NBER 9409; Journal of Economic Perspectives 17(1), 2003) reports that individuals, not special interests, supply most contributions, and that only one in four earlier studies finds that contributions buy votes. The quotation is from the working-paper abstract.

§1.7.2

The paper concerns campaign contributions and does not measure lobbying expenditures. The lobbying-return studies in sections 1.5 and 1.6 answer its question with returns, and they cover one provision, a set of firms and a set of universities. Contributions and lobbying are different channels, and each literature leaves the other's channel untested.

Exhibit 688 · Working paper (published JEP 2003)

Why Is There So Little Money in U.S. Politics?

we argue that campaign contributions are not a form of policy-buying, but are rather a form of political participation and consumption.

Concerns campaign contributions, not lobbying expenditures. Reports that individuals, not special interests, are the main source of contributions and that, controlling for unobserved effects, there is little relationship between money and votes. Quote is from the working-paper abstract.

Source: Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo and Snyder (NBER Working Paper 9409; Journal of Economic Perspectives 17(1):105-130)
Date: 2003
Quoted from: Abstract (NBER WP 9409)
Grade: Peer-reviewed
Document: https://www.nber.org/papers/w9409
Accessed: 2026-11-10
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

Finding POL-1.14Peer-reviewed

Baumgartner and coauthors studied 98 issues, found that 60 percent of lobbying campaigns failed to change policy, and report that resources explain less than 5 percent of the difference between successful and unsuccessful efforts.

The authors also write that the lobbying community so strongly reflects elite interests that it will not alter the balance of power unless its makeup changes, and they describe a system that favors the status quo.

Evidence: Exhibit 689

Mechanism: Lobbying and purchased policy

§1.7.3

The synopsis is from the authors' project page. The 98 issues were mostly contested ones. A provision that passed, such as the 2004 holiday, is a success case, and the 98-issue sample does not contradict it.

Exhibit 689 · Book synopsis

Lobbying and Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why (synopsis)

The authors find that resources explain less than five percent of the difference between successful and unsuccessful efforts.

Book not read; synopsis from the authors' site. Based on 98 issues.

Source: Baumgartner, Berry, Hojnacki, Kimball and Leech, University of Chicago Press (authors' project page)
Date: 2009
Quoted from: Synopsis
Grade: Peer-reviewed
Document: https://fbaum.unc.edu/books/lobby/lobbying-synopsis.htm
Accessed: 2026-11-10
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

1.8 Information and connections

Finding POL-1.15Peer-reviewed

Hall and Deardorff model lobbying as a legislative subsidy, a matching grant of policy information, political intelligence and legislative labor to strategically selected legislators.

The authors state: "We model lobbying not as exchange (vote buying) or persuasion (informative signaling) but as a form of legislative subsidy." The subsidy goes to legislators chosen for shared goals.

Evidence: Exhibit 692

Mechanism: Lobbying and purchased policy

§1.8.1

If the model holds, returns reflect information supplied to allied members and the policy preferences those members already held. Spending then shows coordination with allies, and the model does not treat it as payment for outcomes. Hall and Deardorff do not test the model against the 2004 case.

Exhibit 692 · Journal article

Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy

We model lobbying not as exchange (vote buying) or persuasion (informative signaling) but as a form of legislative subsidy—a matching grant of policy information, political intelligence, and legislative labor to the enterprises of strategically selected legislators.

Abstract read via EconPapers.

Source: Hall and Deardorff, American Political Science Review 100(1):69-84
Date: 2006
Quoted from: Abstract
Grade: Peer-reviewed
Document: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/lobbying-as-legislative-subsidy/AE4B5D8AB9C2487BB78C2A51BB53E03F
Accessed: 2026-11-10
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

Finding POL-1.16Peer-reviewed

Lobbyists with experience in a U.S. Senator's office lose 24 percent of generated revenue when that Senator leaves office (Blanes i Vidal, Draca and Fons-Rosen), and Bertrand, Bombardini and Trebbi find a more consistent monetary premium for connections than for expertise.

Blanes i Vidal, Draca and Fons-Rosen published in the American Economic Review 102(7), and Bertrand, Bombardini and Trebbi in 104(12).

Evidence: Exhibit 690, Exhibit 691

Mechanism: The revolving door

§1.8.2

Bertrand and coauthors find that expertise and connections both operate and that experts are heard across party lines. They still find "a more consistent monetary premium for connections than expertise." The 24 percent revenue drop when a Senator leaves is a loss the information theory does not predict, since a lobbyist's knowledge of policy remains after the Senator departs. Blanes i Vidal and coauthors write that the result is consistent with lobbyists selling access.

§1.8.3

The information theory and the access theory predict different outcomes when a connection ends. The studies document the connection premium and the revenue drop. What connected lobbyists obtain for their clients lies outside both abstracts.

Exhibit 690 · Journal article

Revolving Door Lobbyists

Lobbyists with experience in the office of a US Senator suffer a 24 percent drop in generated revenue when that Senator leaves office.

Abstract read via EconPapers; full text and any party-split results not read.

Source: Blanes i Vidal, Draca and Fons-Rosen, American Economic Review 102(7):3731-3748
Date: 2012
Quoted from: Abstract
Grade: Peer-reviewed
Document: https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.7.3731
Accessed: 2026-11-10
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

Exhibit 691 · Journal article

Is It Whom You Know or What You Know? An Empirical Assessment of the Lobbying Process

However, we find a more consistent monetary premium for connections than expertise.

Abstract read via EconPapers.

Source: Bertrand, Bombardini and Trebbi, American Economic Review 104(12):3885-3920
Date: 2014
Quoted from: Abstract
Grade: Peer-reviewed
Document: https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.12.3885
Accessed: 2026-11-10
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

1.9 The firms that lobby

Finding POL-1.17Primary record

Ballard Partners reported $88.06 million in lobbying income for 2025 and $19.27 million for 2024. For the first three quarters of 2026 it reported $97.27 million: $30.15 million, $32.23 million and $34.89 million.

Evidence: Exhibit 1288, Exhibit 1289

Mechanism: Lobbying and purchased policy

§1.9.1

Ballard reported $9.67 million in 2017, its first year, and between $17.4 million and $23.8 million in each year from 2018 through 2024. Reports typed "No Activity" carry $6.44 million of the 2025 total; without them it is $81.62 million. The figures are the firm's own reports under the Lobbying Disclosure Act, and late amendments can change them.

Exhibit 1288 · Dataset query

Lobbying Disclosure Act filings: Ballard Partners (registrant 401104288), all LD-2 and registration filings, 2017 to third quarter 2026

All 6,179 filings for filing_year 2016 to 2026 read from the API (none for 2016). For each client and quarter the latest posted filing is used. Income by year in $ million: 2017 9.67; 2018 18.02; 2019 18.79; 2020 23.80; 2021 17.44; 2022 17.81; 2023 17.52; 2024 19.27; 2025 88.06; 2026 Q1 to Q3 97.27 (30.15, 32.23, 34.89). Without reports typed "No Activity": 2025 81.62; 2026 Q1 to Q3 90.40.

Source: U.S. Congress (Lobbying Disclosure Act database, lda.gov); query by Lacuna
Date: run 10 November 2026
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://lda.gov/api/v1/filings/?registrant_id=401104288
Accessed: 2026-11-10
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit
Note: Saved with the dataset exhibit lda-2026-top-firms-run: rows in lda-raw-slim-filings.jsonl.gz (query_file ballard-YYYY).

Finding POL-1.18Primary record

Among the large firms whose filings were pulled in full, the largest single-firm annual lobbying income was $36.23 million (Akin Gump, 2016), $39.08 million (Akin Gump, 2017), $56.35 million (Brownstein Hyatt, 2021), $67.88 million (Brownstein Hyatt, 2024) and $88.06 million (Ballard Partners, 2025).

Evidence: Exhibit 1289

Mechanism: Lobbying and purchased policy

§1.9.2

The largest firm's income grew across administrations of both parties. In 2025 Brownstein Hyatt reported $73.83 million, BGR $71.48 million and Akin Gump $65.53 million. Of the 18 firms in the set in both 2024 and 2025, 16 reported more in 2025. Firms outside the set are not ranked, and national totals by year cannot be derived (Finding 1.1).

Exhibit 1289 · Dataset

Dataset: Lobbying Disclosure Act LD-2 income by registrant, pool of large firms, 2016, 2017, 2021, 2024, 2025 and 2026 (Q1 to Q3), with single-quarter snapshots

Method: for each year, second-quarter filings of $100,000 or more per client were pulled to find candidates; then every filing for each pool registrant (top 8 candidates plus a fixed list of large firms) was pulled by registrant_id and filing_year and summed (latest posted filing per registrant, client, quarter). Ranking is of the pool only. Top firm by exact income: Akin Gump 2016 $36.23 million and 2017 $39.08 million; Brownstein Hyatt 2021 $56.35 million and 2024 $67.88 million; Ballard Partners 2025 $88.06 million and 2026 to date $97.27 million. Registrant 401108853 reports $20 million in each 2025 quarter and is excluded from rankings. Anonymous API access limits the query; annual all-registrant totals were not derived.

Source: Lacuna derivation from the Lobbying Disclosure Act database (lda.gov REST API)
Date: run 10 November 2026
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://lda.gov/api/v1/filings/
Accessed: 2026-11-10
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit
Note: Saved copy: research/politics-2026-ballard/lda-top-firms-dataset.json (method, pools, tables) sha256 6d5ba8cbc265f275e1e3d1e7e59a054123ca9133ded22739b885a68663f2f6e4; rows: research/politics-2026-ballard/lda-raw-slim-filings.jsonl.gz sha256 fc6927ae112d54f936bbdef2399bdd3ac49ff1c6c745e6ccf068535c7388f5c3. The url is the API endpoint, not a document.

Finding POL-1.19Primary record

RAI Services Company has been a Ballard client every year from 2017. It paid $440,000 in each of 2017, 2018 and 2019, $560,000 in 2025 and $550,000 for the first three quarters of 2026. In 2025 it reported 20 outside lobbying firms with $3.445 million in income, and Ballard's fee was the largest.

Evidence: Exhibit 1288, Exhibit 1290

Mechanism: Lobbying and purchased policy

§1.9.3

The fee is 0.64 percent of Ballard's 2025 income. RAI Services also reported $7.26 million in lobbying expenses of its own for 2025.

Exhibit 1290 · Dataset query

Lobbying Disclosure Act filings naming RAI Services Company (Reynolds American) as client, 2025 and 2026

In 2025, 20 outside registrants with income reported $3.445 million for RAI Services Company, and RAI Services reported $7.26 million of its own lobbying expenses. For the first three quarters of 2026: 17 outside registrants, $2.735 million; $5.84 million of expenses. Ballard Partners reported $560,000 in 2025 and $550,000 for the first three quarters of 2026; outside registrants also include BGR, Capitol Counsel, King and Spalding, Miller and Chevalier, OnMessage Public Strategies and Williams and Jensen.

Source: U.S. Congress (Lobbying Disclosure Act database, lda.gov); query by Lacuna
Date: run 10 November 2026
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://lda.gov/api/v1/filings/?client_name=rai+services&filing_year=2025
Accessed: 2026-11-10
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit
Note: Results in research/politics-2026-ballard/lda-top-firms-dataset.json (rai_services_lobbying_2025_2026_q1_q3). One subcontract (Old North Strategies for Peter Damon Group) may overlap another registrant's fee.

Finding POL-1.20Primary record

Ballard's Lobbying Disclosure Act reports for RAI Services list "White House Office" among the entities contacted in the second and third quarters of 2026, and list the Food and Drug Administration. The first-quarter 2026 report lists only the House, and the 2025 reports list no White House Office. In those two quarters no other outside lobbying firm for RAI Services lists the White House Office.

Evidence: Exhibit 1291, Exhibit 1290

Mechanism: Lobbying and purchased policy

§1.9.4

The reports state each issue as "Advocated for a harm reduction approach to tobacco regulation by the Food and Drug Administration." They list who was contacted. They do not say who met whom or when. Chapter 5 sets this client's reported payments to political committees beside these filings, and Medicine, Chapter 6 covers FDA's vape enforcement guidance.

Exhibit 1291 · Company filing

Ballard Partners LD-2 reports for client RAI Services Company, first quarter 2025 to third quarter 2026

Seven quarterly reports give the issue text "Advocated for a harm reduction approach to tobacco regulation by the Food and Drug Administration." Income was $140,000 in each 2025 quarter, $150,000 (Q1 2026), $190,000 (Q2 2026) and $210,000 (Q3 2026). The government entities listed include White House Office, Food and Drug Administration, HHS and CMS in the second quarter of 2026 (filed 2026-07-16) and White House Office, FDA and HHS in the third quarter (filed 2026-10-18); the first-quarter 2026 report lists the House only; the 2025 reports list no White House Office.

Source: U.S. Congress (Lobbying Disclosure Act database, lda.gov)
Date: filed 2025-04-19 to 2026-10-18
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://lda.gov/filings/public/filing/e9348592-f256-4f69-a341-8eba2f442b43/print/
Accessed: 2026-11-10
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit
Note: Filing ids and entity lists are in research/politics-2026-ballard/lda-top-firms-dataset.json (ballard_filings_for_rai_services). The url is the second-quarter 2026 report.

1.10 Which parties the record covers

§1.10.1

The politics subject applies the same test to every party, and this chapter's record covers the parties unevenly. The table lists each case and what the documents establish.

Party coverage of the cases in this chapter
Case	Control of Congress	What the record establishes
2004 repatriation provision	Republican	Roll-call votes by party in both chambers; peer-reviewed and CRS findings on effects
Senate PSI report on repatriation, 2011	Democratic majority staff	One party's staff document. The cited record includes no minority response
Revolving door, Homeland Investment Coalition	Republican	One Republican former Member in the filings. No Democratic counterpart documented here
Dodd-Frank, Federal Reserve rulemaking	Democratic-era statute	One peer-reviewed event study. No filings by the firms named
Dodd-Frank auto-dealer exemption, 2010	Democratic-era statute	A 60 to 30 Senate vote with yeas from both parties. Party breakdown and enacted text not in the cited record
Largest lobbying firm's income, 2016 to 2026	Both	Filings across Democratic and Republican administrations. A firm's client list is not a party record
2017 tax act, 2009 to 2010 health law, Medicare Part D	Both parties	Not established

§1.10.2

No cited study ties lobbying returns to specific provisions of the 2017 tax act. The Federal Reserve paper on effective tax rates by Dobridge and coauthors (2023) shows rate changes and no lobbying returns. A primary pair would combine Lobbying Disclosure Act filings by named firms with the enacted section text.

§1.10.3

The 2009 White House agreement with the pharmaceutical trade association PhRMA, reported at about $80 billion, and the Medicare Part D clause barring price negotiation rest on press accounts and a 2012 House Republican release. No finding in this chapter uses them.

§1.10.4

The chapter does not claim balance beyond the table. Where one case supplies the evidence for a mechanism, the finding says which case and which party controlled the process.

§1.10.5

Medicine, Chapter 6 (Money, Fees and the Revolving Door) documents lobbying and the revolving door at FDA and HHS, and War and Defense, Chapter 4 (The Revolving Door) documents them at the Pentagon.

Key findings

National lobbying totals by year are not reported; the database counts are filing counts only (1.1).
The 2004 provision set an effective 5.25 percent rate, and $312 billion was repatriated (1.2).
The conference report passed with votes from both parties in a Republican-controlled Congress (1.3).
The Homeland Investment Coalition reported $700,000 for 2003 and $620,000 on its 2004 mid-year report (1.4).
A former House member is a listed lobbyist on the coalition's registration (1.5).
Repatriating firms, including lobbying firms, did not raise domestic investment or employment (1.6).
Studies find the funds went to share repurchases, with fungibility stated (1.7).
The Democratic majority-staff report of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations counts 20,931 net U.S. jobs lost at the top 15 repatriators (1.8).
One study reports more than $220 per $1 spent on lobbying for the provision (1.9).
Studies of other samples find positive associations with tax rates, earmarks and performance (1.10).
Meetings with the Federal Reserve Board were associated with abnormal returns under Dodd-Frank (1.11).
The Senate voted 60 to 30 for the auto-dealer exemption, with both parties among the yeas (1.12).
Ansolabehere and coauthors find little relationship between contributions and votes (1.13).
Baumgartner and coauthors find resources explain under 5 percent of lobbying success (1.14).
Hall and Deardorff model lobbying as a legislative subsidy to allies (1.15).
Lobbyists lose 24 percent of revenue when their Senator leaves, and connections carry a steadier premium than expertise (1.16).
Ballard Partners reported $88.06 million in lobbying income for 2025, four and a half times its 2024 total (1.17).
The largest firm's annual income grew across Democratic and Republican administrations (1.18).
RAI Services has been a Ballard client every year since 2017 and paid the largest outside fee it reported for 2025 (1.19).
Ballard's reports for that client list the White House Office in two quarters of 2026 and no other outside firm does (1.20).

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