The Revolving Door
Abstract
Federal law limits the contacts that former Defense Department officials may have with their old agency. It does not bar them from working for a contractor. The Government Accountability Office counted 2,435 former senior and acquisition officials at 52 contractors in 2006 and 1,718 at 14 contractors in 2019, and in both studies the contractors reported fewer than GAO found. Seven named officials moved between the Pentagon and contractor boards or payrolls in documented steps from 2009 to 2021, under three administrations. The four who stated recusal terms in their own agreements gave periods of one year, four years or the duration of service. The Inspector General did not substantiate allegations that Shanahan promoted Boeing. A 2024 study commissioned by the Department found no measurable effect of the restrictions on recruitment and retention. That study contains no analysis of contract awards or prices.
4.1 What the law restricts
Congress regulates what officials may do after leaving the Pentagon through several statutes of different ages. GAO reviewed earlier contractor reporting systems in 1989 and 1990, and the requirements were repealed in 1995. The rules in force in 2026 are listed below.
| Provision | Who | What it restricts |
|---|---|---|
| 18 U.S.C. § 207(a) | Former executive-branch officers and employees | Permanent bar on communications to the government on matters in which they participated personally and substantially; two-year bar on matters actually pending under their official responsibility |
| 18 U.S.C. § 207(c) | Senior personnel, including active-duty officers of pay grade O-7 or above | One year: communications to the former agency, with intent to influence |
| 18 U.S.C. § 207(d) | Very senior personnel | Two years: the same communications |
| 18 U.S.C. § 207(e) | Former Senators; former House Members | Two years (Senators) and one year (House Members) on lobbying Congress |
| 41 U.S.C. §§ 2103–2104 | Officials in listed roles on contracts over $10,000,000 | One year: compensation from the contractor as employee, officer, director or consultant. Pay from a division or affiliate that does not produce the same or similar products is permitted. An official contacted by an offeror about employment must report the contact in writing |
| Pub. L. 110-181, § 847 (FY2008 NDAA) | Covered DoD officials | Two years: contractors may not knowingly pay a former covered official without first determining that the official sought a written ethics opinion. DoD keeps the opinions for at least five years |
| Pub. L. 115-91, § 1045 (FY2018 NDAA) | Officers O-9 and above and civilian equivalents; officers O-7 and O-8 | Two years (O-9 and above) or one year (O-7 and O-8): lobbying activities with respect to DoD |
Under 18 U.S.C. § 207, former executive-branch officials may not contact their former agency on behalf of others for one year (senior personnel) or two years (very senior personnel), and may never do so on matters they handled personally and substantially. The statute does not bar employment with a contractor.
Section 207(c)(1) applies to a former employee who, within one year of leaving, "knowingly makes, with the intent to influence, any communication to or appearance before any officer or employee of the department or agency in which such person served within 1 year before such termination." The restriction attaches to the act of contact. A retired officer or official may accept a contractor's job, board seat or consulting role, and may work on a contractor's behalf without contacting the former agency.
Evidence: Exhibit 349
Mechanism: The revolving door
Section 207(d) extends the period to two years for very senior personnel. The permanent bar in § 207(a) applies to particular matters the person handled personally and substantially. Each subsection of § 207 governs communications. Employment at a contractor falls outside § 207.
Three further rules apply to former Defense Department personnel. Certain contracting officials may not take compensation from the contractor for one year (41 U.S.C. § 2104); covered officials must seek a written ethics opinion before contractor employment within two years (FY2008 NDAA § 847); and officers of grade O-9 and above, with civilian equivalents, may not lobby the Department for two years, and O-7 and O-8 officers for one year (FY2018 NDAA § 1045).
Section 2104 of title 41 bars compensation from a contractor for one year, but only for officials who served in listed roles on contracts above $10 million, and it permits pay from a division that does not produce the same or similar products. Section 847 requires an opinion to be sought and does not require it to be favorable. Section 1045 covers lobbying activities as the Lobbying Disclosure Act defines them. It applies to officers of grade O-7 and above and their civilian equivalents.
Evidence: Exhibit 350, Exhibit 351, Exhibit 352
Mechanism: The revolving door
4.2 How many former officials work for contractors
GAO has counted the population twice, in reports published thirteen years apart. For the 2008 report GAO matched Defense Department personnel records to IRS data and to data from 52 contractors. It examined about 35,000 senior and acquisition officials who had left in the six years since January 2001. GAO wrote that in 2006 the 52 contractors employed 86,181 of the 1,857,004 former military and civilian personnel who had left DoD service since 2001.
In 2008 the Government Accountability Office reported that 52 major defense contractors employed 2,435 former Defense Department senior and acquisition officials in 2006, and that seven of the firms employed 1,581 of them. The contractors' own data showed 1,263, and GAO described its IRS-based figure as almost twice as many.
The 2,435 officials were a subset of the 86,181. Seven firms held 1,581 of the 2,435, or 64.9 percent, and those seven held over 40 percent of the value of contract awards to the 52. Fiscal year 2005 awards to the 52 contractors totaled $142,833 million. GAO's survey found that contractors do not have to record the information: it wrote that "there is no statutory or regulatory requirement that a contractor collect, have, or maintain this information." Of 47 contractors that responded, 38 asked applicants whether they were former DoD employees and 34 asked for the ethics letter.
Evidence: Exhibit 353
Mechanism: The revolving door
| Contractor | Former officials |
|---|---|
| Science Applications International Corporation | 263 |
| Northrop Grumman | 260 |
| Booz Allen Hamilton | 243 |
| L3 | 241 |
| Lockheed Martin | 221 |
| General Dynamics | 207 |
| Raytheon | 146 |
| Seven contractors | 1,581 |
GAO extrapolated from a sample that at least 422 of the 2,435 could have been working on defense contracts under the responsibility of their former agency, office or command, and at least nine on the same contracts they had overseen at DoD. GAO stated that the estimate was not evidence of violations and said it found none. DoD concurred with GAO's recommendation to consider whether contractors should face additional reporting requirements. GAO also wrote: "There are acknowledged benefits to employing former government officials for both DOD and defense contractors."
Exhibit 353 · Government report
Defense Contracting: Post-Government Employment of Former DOD Officials Needs Greater Transparency (GAO-08-485)
contractor data provided to us showed they employed 1,263 individuals in 2006 who matched our criteria as former DOD senior and acquisition officials, while our analysis of IRS data showed the contractors employed 2,435 former DOD senior and acquisition officials in 2006, or almost twice as many
In 2006, 52 contractors employed 2,435 former DoD senior and acquisition officials; seven employed 1,581. Contractors reported 1,263. Sample extrapolation: at least 422 could have worked on contracts under their former agency's responsibility and at least nine on the same contracts they oversaw. GAO says it found no violations. DoD concurred with the recommendation.
- Source
- U.S. Government Accountability Office
- Date
- 21 May 2008
- Quoted from
- GAO-08-485, Results in Brief, p. 5
- Grade
- Primary record
- Document
- https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-08-485
- Accessed
- 2026-11-09
- Cited by
- Findings citing this exhibit
GAO's 2008 case examples include a retired rear admiral who pleaded guilty under § 207 in July 2007 and paid a $15,000 fine.
In 2021 GAO reported that 14 major contractors employed 1,718 former Defense Department senior and acquisition officials in 2019. The ten contractors that supplied data reported 816 such officials where GAO's DoD and IRS data identified 1,149, and GAO could not reconcile the difference.
The 2021 report covered a different and smaller set of firms, drawn from contractors with more than $500 million in DoD obligations. Sixteen firms were reduced to 14 by two mergers. Of the 1,718 officials, 1,616 were acquisition officials (970 civilian and 646 military officers of grades O-3 to O-6) and 102 were senior officials (27 civilian and 75 military). The 14 firms employed 35,314 others, for a total of 37,032. The two reports count different firms and cannot be read as a trend.
Evidence: Exhibit 354
Mechanism: The revolving door
| Contractor | Former officials |
|---|---|
| Raytheon Technologies | 315 |
| Northrop Grumman | 289 |
| General Dynamics | 287 |
| Lockheed Martin | 253 |
| L3Harris | 168 |
| Boeing | 160 |
| BAE Systems | 108 |
| FedEx | 48 |
| General Atomics | 38 |
| General Electric | 31 |
The other four contractors each employed 10 or fewer. In both studies GAO compared its own findings with what contractors reported. In 2008 the contractors reported 1,263 against 2,435 in GAO's IRS-based analysis. In 2019 the ten contractors that supplied data reported 816 potentially covered officials against 1,149 in GAO's DoD and IRS data, and GAO wrote that it was "unable to reconcile the differences."
4.3 What the Department tracked
The DoD Inspector General concluded in 2014 that the Department's database of section 847 ethics opinions was "of marginal value" as a management control system. In 2021 GAO recommended that DoD assess adding the lobbying prohibitions to its acquisition regulation, and DoD concurred.
The Inspector General's evaluation (DODIG-2014-050) examined the central database that DoD keeps under section 847. It recorded 379 entries between January 2012 and May 2013, of which Army accounted for 140, Navy 124 and the Office of the Secretary of Defense 50. The National Security Agency, the Defense Contract Audit Agency and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service recorded none. The Inspector General wrote that "more than 80 percent of all section 847 activity was accounted for by only three Components," and concluded that DoD "may not have fully complied with the intent of the law."
Evidence: Exhibit 355, Exhibit 354
Mechanism: The revolving door, The study not run
GAO's 2021 report records that the Inspector General's December 2019 follow-up (DODIG-2020-044) found 100 percent of sampled requests in the database and 97 percent answered within 30 days.
GAO also recommended in 2021 that DoD assess whether to add the lobbying prohibitions to its acquisition regulation (DFARS 252.203-7005). DoD had not considered it and concurred. GAO described "only a handful of reported PGE violations by former DOD personnel over the last decade." Its examples are a former Air Force captain placed on probation in 2015 and a Defense Digital Services product manager in 2017 whom the Inspector General referred to the Department of Justice, which "declined to prosecute the case." The DoD Standards of Conduct Office told GAO that most major contractors take compliance seriously and that violations come from individual bad actors.
4.4 Two tallies, two sources
Two reports count former officials, members of Congress and senior staff who hold lobbying, board or executive roles at the top 20 defense contractors. The Project On Government Oversight (POGO) published its count on 5 November 2018 in "Brass Parachutes." Senator Elizabeth Warren's office published "Pentagon Alchemy" in April 2023. The 645 figure is POGO's and the 672 figure is Warren's.
The Project On Government Oversight counted 645 instances in 2018 in which the top 20 contractors of fiscal year 2016 employed former senior officials, officers, Members of Congress or senior staff as lobbyists, directors or executives, 562 of them as lobbyists. Senator Warren's staff report of April 2023 counted 672 such cases for 2022, 613 of them registered lobbyists.
POGO built its database from Department websites, Senate confirmation lists, company releases, some LinkedIn profiles and Freedom of Information requests, and counted each person once per company. Warren's staff built its list from the OpenSecrets Revolving Door database, corporate websites, lobbying disclosures and Senate confirmation lists, and describes the list as non-exhaustive. The counts are each report's own.
Evidence: Exhibit 357, Exhibit 358
Mechanism: The revolving door
| Publisher | Year counted | Total | Lobbyists | Executives | Directors |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Project On Government Oversight | 2018 | 645 | 562 | 41 | 42 |
| Office of Senator Warren | 2022 | 672 | 613 | 25 | 34 |
POGO also reported at least 380 high-ranking Defense Department officials and officers in its database, a quarter of them (95) at the top five contractors. It wrote that most of the cases are individuals who went from senior Pentagon positions to work directly for defense contractors, and "The vast majority of the individuals identified in this report did not violate any law or regulation." The report argues that the rules are the gap. It records that only three Pentagon employees had been prosecuted for violating post-employment restrictions in ten years. Its acknowledgments thank the Charles Koch Foundation.
Warren's report found that 91 percent of its 672 cases were registered lobbyists. Its table of contractors includes companies that the report footnotes as COVID-era DoD contractors, among them Pfizer, Humana, Moderna, Regeneron and Centene, alongside General Electric and McKesson. The two counts therefore cover overlapping but different lists of firms. In Warren's Table 1 the Pfizer row prints a total of 73 although its parts sum to 74, and the printed column totals are 613, 25, 34 and 672.
Exhibit 358 · Oversight report
Pentagon Alchemy: How Defense Officials Pass Through the Revolving Door and Peddle Brass for Gold
This analysis identified 672 cases in 2022 in which the top 20 defense contractors had former government officials, military officers, Members of Congress, and senior legislative staff working for them as lobbyists, board members, or senior executives.
672 cases in 2022 at the top 20 contractors (613 lobbyists, 25 executives, 34 directors); 91 percent registered lobbyists. The staff list is described in the report as non-exhaustive. The table includes COVID-era DoD contractors such as Pfizer and Moderna.
- Source
- Senator Elizabeth Warren (staff report)
- Date
- April 2023
- Quoted from
- Section III.A, pp. 2-3
- Grade
- Reported
- Document
- https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/DoD%20Revolving%20Door%20Report.pdf
- Accessed
- 2026-11-09
- Cited by
- Findings citing this exhibit
- Note
- This is Senator Warren's own report; the 645 figure belongs to POGO (Exhibit for 5 November 2018), and no Warren report of 2018 was located. In Table 1 the Pfizer row prints a total of 73 although its parts (71 + 1 + 2) sum to 74; the printed column totals are 613, 25, 34 and 672.
4.5 Documented moves
The record documents seven officials who moved between Defense Department posts and contractor roles. The dates span 2009 to 2021 and three administrations: Lynn's confirmation process in 2009 (Obama), Work's appointment in 2014 (Obama), the Trump administration's Mattis, Shanahan and Esper, and Austin in 2021 (Biden). Each step below comes from the official's own letter, an SEC filing, a company release or an inspector general report.
| Official | Documented steps |
|---|---|
| William J. Lynn III | Raytheon senior vice president for government operations and strategy and registered Raytheon lobbyist through the first quarter of 2008; letter of January 2009 to Senator McCain as nominee for Deputy Secretary of Defense |
| Robert O. Work | Deputy Secretary of Defense from 2014 "through July 2017"; elected a Raytheon director on 14 August 2017. Chief executive of the Center for a New American Security 2013 to 2014 |
| Ellen M. Pawlikowski | Retired as Commander, Air Force Materiel Command on 1 September 2018; elected a Raytheon director on 6 September 2018 |
| James N. Mattis | Retired from the Marine Corps in May 2013; General Dynamics director from 7 August 2013; announced on 5 January 2017 that he would resign upon confirmation as Secretary of Defense; succeeded by Acting Secretary Shanahan on 1 January 2019 (DoD IG report); re-elected a General Dynamics director on 7 August 2019 |
| Lloyd J. Austin III | Retired from the Army in May 2016; United Technologies director effective 1 September 2016; resigned from the Raytheon Technologies board effective 22 January 2021 after Senate confirmation as Secretary of Defense |
| Mark T. Esper | Raytheon position; ethics agreement of 26 July 2017 as nominee for Secretary of the Army, resigning from Raytheon on confirmation; later Secretary of the Army and Secretary of Defense |
| Patrick M. Shanahan | Boeing, March 1986 to June 2017, last as senior vice president for supply chain and operations; nominated Deputy Secretary of Defense on 7 June 2017, confirmed 18 July, began 19 July 2017; Acting Secretary of Defense from 1 January 2019 |
Seven officials are documented moving between Defense Department posts and the boards or payrolls of defense contractors in dated steps from 2009 to 2021, under the Obama, Trump and Biden administrations. Five of them (Lynn, Shanahan, Esper, Mattis and Austin) came to senior Pentagon posts from contractor roles, and four (Work, Pawlikowski, Mattis and Austin) took contractor board seats after leaving DoD posts or the armed services.
Raytheon's release on Work's election states that he "was appointed the 31st Deputy Secretary of Defense by President Barack Obama in 2014, a position he held through July 2017." Pawlikowski retired on 1 September 2018 and was elected a Raytheon director on 6 September 2018. Mattis and Austin each held a contractor board seat between military retirement and appointment as Secretary of Defense. Mattis returned to the General Dynamics board about seven months after leaving the Department.
Evidence: Exhibit 362, Exhibit 369, Exhibit 370, Exhibit 366, Exhibit 367, Exhibit 368, Exhibit 364, Exhibit 365, Exhibit 360, Exhibit 356
Mechanism: The revolving door
The contractor-to-Pentagon direction is documented for five officials: Lynn, Shanahan, Esper, Mattis and Austin.
4.6 Recusal terms as stated
An ethics agreement is the nominee's written commitment to the Department's ethics official. The table gives each stated term in the document's own terms. Shanahan's agreement is known through the Inspector General's description, because the agreement pages in the report are images.
| Official | Contractor | Document | Stated recusal |
|---|---|---|---|
| Shanahan | Boeing | Letter of 7 June 2017 (as described by DoD IG) | Disqualified from particular matters involving specific parties in which he knew Boeing was a party or represented a party, unless first authorized in writing by the ethics official; for the duration of his DoD service |
| Esper | Raytheon | Ethics agreement of 26 July 2017 | One year after resignation from matters involving specific parties in which Raytheon is a party or represents a party; continuing recusal from matters affecting his deferred compensation unless he first obtains a written waiver |
| Mattis | General Dynamics | Ethics agreement of 5 January 2017 | One year after resignation, from particular matters involving specific parties in which he knows General Dynamics is a party |
| Austin | Raytheon Technologies | Screening memorandum of 6 May 2021 | Four years from his appointment as Secretary of Defense |
Four officials who came to the Pentagon from contractor roles stated their recusal terms in their own agreements: Shanahan (Boeing), for the duration of his service; Esper (Raytheon), one year, with a continuing limit tied to his deferred compensation; Mattis (General Dynamics), one year; and Austin (Raytheon Technologies), four years. The DoD Inspector General investigated 2019 allegations that Shanahan promoted Boeing and did not substantiate any of them.
Shanahan's disqualification period is usually two years, and the IG's report states that he agreed to a period for the duration of his service. The IG interviewed Shanahan and 33 witnesses under oath and stated: "We did not substantiate any of the allegations. We determined that Mr. Shanahan fully complied with his ethics agreements and his ethical obligations regarding Boeing and its competitors." The IG found that the screening arrangement was adhered to and worked well.
Evidence: Exhibit 356, Exhibit 360, Exhibit 361, Exhibit 363, Exhibit 359
Mechanism: The revolving door
Exhibit 356 · Inspector general evaluation
Report of Investigation: Mr. Patrick M. Shanahan, Acting Secretary of Defense (DODIG-2019-082)
We did not substantiate any of the allegations. We determined that Mr. Shanahan fully complied with his ethics agreements and his ethical obligations regarding Boeing and its competitors.
Investigation of allegations that Shanahan promoted Boeing. Interviewed Shanahan and 33 witnesses under oath. Records Shanahan's Boeing career (March 1986 to June 2017), his 7 June 2017 recusal letter and the screening arrangement. Did not substantiate any allegation.
- Source
- DoD Office of Inspector General
- Date
- 25 April 2019
- Quoted from
- DODIG-2019-082, p. 5
- Grade
- Primary record
- Document
- https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/25/2002120583/-1/-1/1/DODIG-2019-082.PDF
- Accessed
- 2026-11-09
- Cited by
- Findings citing this exhibit
Esper's agreement states: "Upon confirmation, I will resign from my position with Raytheon Company," and divestiture of Raytheon stock within 90 days. He remained entitled to participate in Raytheon's deferred compensation plan. At his 16 July 2019 confirmation hearing, Senator Warren asked him to extend the recusal for his full tenure and to agree not to seek a waiver. Esper declined to extend it: "On the advice of my ethics folks at the Pentagon, the career professionals, no." Asked whether he would agree not to seek a waiver, he answered: "Uh, no Senator, I won't." He submitted a letter from the Standards of Conduct Office stating that he did not request, seek or receive a waiver or authorization while serving as Secretary of the Army or Acting Secretary of Defense. The transcript is the one posted by Warren's office.
Mattis's agreement states that he would forfeit unvested General Dynamics restricted stock and options and divest the rest within 90 days of confirmation. He kept Theranos stock, with recusal while he held it. Austin's memorandum of 6 May 2021 states that it supersedes the screening arrangement of 22 January 2021 and accounts for his recent divestitures. It sets two-year recusal periods for Booz Allen Hamilton, Austin Strategy Group, Tenet, Pine Island Capital Partners, Nucor, Guest Services, Carnegie Corporation, Auburn University, Fidelity and JPMorgan.
4.7 The think tanks
Defense contractors also appear on the published donor lists of two policy institutes. Each list gives dollar bands, not amounts, so the site's money-flow register records every contribution with no amount and states the band in its note. Work led the Center for a New American Security from 2013 to 2014, according to the Raytheon release of 14 August 2017.
The fiscal year 2025 donor lists of the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Center for a New American Security name Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics, Boeing and RTX among their corporate donors, in published dollar bands.
CSIS lists donors of $5,000 and more for 1 October 2024 to 30 September 2025. General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman and General Atomics are in the band of $250,000 and up. Boeing, RTX and others are in the $100,000 to $249,999 band. The Center for a New American Security lists Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation at $500,000 and above. Its list also names the Defense Department's Chief Digital and AI Office in that band and DARPA in the $100,000 to $249,999 band.
Evidence: Exhibit 372, Exhibit 373
| Contractor | CSIS | CNAS |
|---|---|---|
| Northrop Grumman | $250,000 and up | $500,000 and above |
| Lockheed Martin | $250,000 and up | $100,000–$249,999 |
| General Dynamics | $250,000 and up | $25,000–$49,999 |
| RTX | $100,000–$249,999 | $100,000–$249,999 |
| Boeing | $100,000–$249,999 | $50,000–$99,999 |
The Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, which is itself a think tank, summed the lower ends of self-reported donor ranges for 50 think tanks in a January 2025 brief. It reports more than $34.7 million from top Pentagon contractors since 2019 and that 20 of the 32 think tanks that publish donors received contractor money.
4.8 The case for the movement
A 2024 study by the Institute for Defense Analyses, commissioned by the DoD Standards of Conduct Office, found no measurable effect of the post-government employment restrictions on recruitment and retention. It also found that well under one percent of retired senior officials are registered lobbyists for the top 100 defense contractors.
The Institute for Defense Analyses is a federally funded research center paid by the Department, and the Standards of Conduct Office commissioned this review. The study covered § 1045, § 1117 of the FY2022 NDAA, 10 U.S.C. § 988 and § 847. It judged § 1045 "the most problematic" provision. It found that about 2 percent of the retired officials it examined work for the top 10 contractors, about one-quarter work for the top 100, and roughly a third work for non-profits, associations, think tanks, research centers and universities.
Evidence: Exhibit 371
Mechanism: The revolving door
Exhibit 371 · Research advisory report
Effects of Certain Ethics Requirements on DOD Hiring, Retention, and Operations (IDA Product 3001788)
IDA’s analysis shows that well under one percent of these retired officials are registered lobbyists for top 100 defense contractors.
Congressionally required review of sec. 1045, sec. 1117 (FY2022), 10 U.S.C. 988 and sec. 847. No measurable effect of the restrictions on recruitment and retention; sec. 1045 judged 'most problematic'; well under one percent of retired senior officials are registered lobbyists for top-100 contractors; removal of the provisions unlikely to affect arms-length contracting given other safeguards.
- Source
- Institute for Defense Analyses (for DoD Standards of Conduct Office)
- Date
- April 2024
- Quoted from
- Executive Summary, p. v
- Grade
- Primary record
- Document
- https://ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/e/ef/effects-of-certain-ethics-requirements-on-dod-hiring-retention-and-operations/3001788.ashx
- Accessed
- 2026-11-09
- Cited by
- Findings citing this exhibit
- Note
- Sponsor-commissioned: IDA is an FFRDC paid by the DoD office whose rules it reviewed.
IDA concluded that removing or altering the provisions it reviewed "is unlikely to have a perceptible impact on the ability of the Department to negotiate and execute contracts on an arms-length basis," citing competition and bid-protest safeguards. Its interviews recorded that former officials serve as "an avenue for frank conversation" between the Department and industry. The report carries a disclaimer that its views are not the Department's official position. The study examined hiring, retention and operations. It contains no analysis of contract awards or prices.
The record contains three arguments for movement between sectors. GAO states that there are acknowledged benefits to both sides. IDA's interviews report value in former officials who translate Department needs for industry and help non-traditional firms enter defense work. The safeguards in § 4.1 apply together with ethics pledges, a DFARS representation that offerors comply, screening arrangements and competition. GAO reported only a handful of violations in a decade, and POGO found three prosecutions in ten years. IDA also recorded some anecdotal harm to the hiring of civilians from the restrictions.
4.9 What the record does not contain
The GAO, Inspector General and IDA reports cited above count officials and describe rules. None of them tests whether hiring former Defense Department officials changes contract awards, prices or cost growth.
One peer-reviewed study addresses a related question. Luechinger and Moser (Journal of Public Economics, 2014) studied Senate-confirmed Defense Department appointees across six administrations and, according to its abstract, report positive abnormal stock returns for the firms involved. The result concerns market value at the time of appointment.
Key findings
- Section 207 limits contacts with the former agency and does not bar employment with a contractor (4.1).
- Three Defense-specific rules add a one-year compensation bar for certain contracting officials, an ethics-opinion requirement and a lobbying ban (4.2).
- GAO found 2,435 former senior and acquisition officials at 52 contractors in 2006 and 1,718 at 14 in 2019, and the contractors reported fewer in both studies (4.3, 4.4).
- The Inspector General judged the section 847 database of marginal value, and DoD had not considered adding the lobbying ban to its acquisition regulation (4.5).
- POGO counted 645 instances in 2018 and Senator Warren's staff counted 672 in 2022 (4.6).
- Seven officials are documented moving between the Pentagon and contractors under three administrations, and four stated recusal terms of one year, four years or the duration of service (4.7, 4.8).
- CSIS and CNAS list the largest contractors as donors in published bands (4.9).
- A DoD-commissioned 2024 study found no measurable effect of the restrictions on recruitment and retention (4.10).