Chapter 5

Concentration

Abstract

USDA’s own series show that the four largest packers took 85 percent of steer and heifer slaughter and 67 percent of hog slaughter in 2019, against 36 and 34 percent in 1980. USDA’s Economic Research Service attributes most of that rise to larger plants and says mergers played a limited role. The rules that define unfair practices under the Packers and Stockyards Act were proposed, limited, withdrawn, finalized, expanded and delayed between 2010 and 2026, under administrations of both parties. Price-fixing allegations against chicken, pork and beef processors have produced one corporate guilty plea, individual acquittals, a defense verdict in the first broiler trial and class settlements, for which Tyson states that it admits no liability. In seed, three mergers cleared in 2017 and 2018 only with divestitures; two companies accounted for 72 percent of planted corn acres and 66 percent of soybean acres in 2018 to 2020, and USDA says the evidence is mixed on whether concentration raised seed prices. The chapter also records the AGRA program in Africa, the one non-peer-reviewed assessment of it and AGRA’s reply, a Gates Trust holding of Monsanto shares and a reported farmland acreage. None of those records shows an intent. No record in this chapter addresses glyphosate and disease; Medicine chapters 4, 5, 6 and 8 hold that record.

5.1 Shares in packing and processing

Finding AGR-5.1Primary record

USDA data show that the four largest packers' share of steer and heifer slaughter rose from 36 percent in 1980 to 85 percent in 2019, and their share of hog slaughter rose from 34 percent to 67 percent. In 2019 the four largest firms held 53 percent of broiler chicken and 55 percent of turkey production.

USDA’s Economic Research Service (ERS) states in its 2023 bulletin: “In 2019, the four largest meatpackers accounted for 85 percent of steer and heifer slaughter and 67 percent of hog slaughter.” Its Table 6 draws on the Packers and Stockyards Program series published in the Division’s annual reports.

Evidence: Exhibit 608, Exhibit 609

Share of production held by the four largest firms (CR4), percent
Species	1980	1995	2010	2019
Steers and heifers	36	81	85	85
Hogs	34	46	65	67
Broiler chickens	–	50	51	53
Turkeys	–	41	56	55

§5.1.1

Source: ERS Economic Information Bulletin 256, Table 6 (p. 25). The poultry series in that table begins in 1995. ERS states that no mature U.S. industry showed so large a change so fast as steer and heifer packing between 1980 and 1995, when the share rose from 36 to 81 percent.

§5.1.2

The Packers and Stockyards Division’s 2020 annual report, Table 5 (p. 10), gives annual figures for 2010 to 2019: steers and heifers 83 to 85 percent, hogs 62 to 70 percent, broilers 50 to 54 percent, turkeys 53 to 58 percent. The report states that regional markets are more concentrated than national figures and that about 22 percent of broiler growers have one integrator in their area.

§5.1.3

The White House fact sheet of January 2022 gives 54 percent for poultry and “about 70 percent” for pork. Those figures match the 2018 column of the same series. The series used here ends in 2019.

Exhibit 608 · Agency research report

Concentration and Competition in U.S. Agribusiness (Economic Information Bulletin 256)

In 2019, the four largest meatpackers accounted for 85 percent of steer and heifer slaughter and 67 percent of hog slaughter.

Reviewed by ERS technical peers before release. Table 6 (p. 25) gives four-firm concentration ratios (CR4) from Packers and Stockyards Program reports: steers and heifers 36 (1980), 81 (1995), 85 (2010), 85 (2019); hogs 34, 46, 65, 67; broilers 50 (1995), 51, 53; turkeys 41 (1995), 56, 55. Table 1 (p. 11) gives seed shares. Pp. 19-23 describe the Dow-DuPont, ChemChina-Syngenta and Bayer-Monsanto reviews and the divestitures. P. 15 reports seed prices up 270 percent from 1990 to 2020 against 56 percent for commodities and says the evidence is mixed on whether concentration caused the rise. P. 32 reports the farm-to-wholesale beef spread doubled between 2015 and 2019. P. 36 concludes that concentration came mostly from larger plants rather than mergers, that pre-2010 studies found limited packer market power, and that post-2010 spreads suggest more market power. Pp. 34-35 summarize the DOJ chicken cases, including that "individual defendants were acquitted in jury trials."

Source: USDA Economic Research Service (MacDonald, Dong and Fuglie)
Date: June 2023
Quoted from: Summary page, "What Did the Study Find?", first bullet
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/106795/eib-256.pdf
Accessed: 2026-11-09
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

Exhibit 609 · Agency annual report

Packers and Stockyards Division Annual Report 2020

Concentration in steer and heifer purchases ranged from 83 to 85 percent in the past decade.

Table 5 (p. 10) gives annual CR4 for 2010-2019: steers and heifers 83 to 85; hogs 62 to 70 (67 in 2019); broilers 50 to 54 (53 in 2019); turkeys 53 to 58 (55 in 2019). Says regional markets are more concentrated than national figures and that about 22 percent of broiler growers have one integrator in their area. This is the underlying series ERS used for Table 6.

Source: USDA Agricultural Marketing Service, Packers and Stockyards Division
Date: 2020 (data through 2019)
Quoted from: p. 9, "Concentration in Meat Packing and Poultry Processing"
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/PackersandStockyardsAnnualReport2020.pdf
Accessed: 2026-11-09
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit
Note: Reports after the 2020 edition (2021-2024) were not retrievable; CR4 after 2019 is a gap.

5.2 What USDA and GAO attribute it to

Finding AGR-5.2Primary record

USDA's Economic Research Service attributes the rise in beef and pork packing concentration mostly to larger plants and says mergers played a limited role. ERS also reports that the farm-to-wholesale beef price spread doubled between 2015 and 2019. GAO estimated that fed cattle prices in 2013 to 2015 may have been about 9 percent higher in areas with less packer concentration than in areas with more, and stated that this evidence alone does not imply anticompetitive or improper behavior.

ERS states that concentration “reflected a consolidation of production into fewer but larger firms, driven by technological innovations, changes in market demand, and redesigned supply chains.” GAO’s April 2018 report states: “Evidence of this effect alone does not imply that packers engaged in anticompetitive or improper behavior” (p. 16).

Evidence: Exhibit 608, Exhibit 610, Exhibit 611, Exhibit 636

§5.2.1

ERS states that “the relationship between concentration and market power is not tight.” It reports that studies from before 2010 “found limited evidence of packer market power” and that lower processing costs were “largely passed to consumers.” It also records that some local markets have only two or three buyers, and that price spreads since 2010 suggest more market power. The farm-to-wholesale beef spread was without a strong trend for 30 years and doubled between 2015 and 2019.

§5.2.2

ERS’s account of the legal record includes Cargill v. Monfort, 479 U.S. 104 (1986), in which the Court let Cargill buy Spencer Foods. It also records that DOJ and 13 states sued on 20 October 2008 to block JBS from buying National Beef and that JBS dropped that purchase. The Congressional Research Service records that DOJ did not challenge JBS’s purchase of Smithfield Beef.

§5.2.3

GAO modeled fed cattle transactions for 2013 to 2015. Prices in areas at the 25th percentile of concentration may have been about 9 percent higher than in areas at the 75th percentile. GAO states that such a difference “can exist in legitimately functioning markets.” GAO also found that competition levels did not appear to affect the national price change in 2015, and it reports that the Commodity Futures Trading Commission found no evidence of trading irregularities in cattle futures that year.

§5.2.4

The packers’ trade association, the North American Meat Institute, stated on 7 November 2025 that “beef packers have been losing money because the price of cattle is at record highs.” Packer margin data would be needed to compare the ERS spread data with the Meat Institute statement.

§5.2.5

DOJ’s May 2012 report on its 2010 agricultural workshops lists market concentration, monopsony, bid rigging, captive supply and contracting among recurring themes. It states that participants “offered varied—and at times contradictory—accounts of the problems they face and the solutions they envision.”

Exhibit 610 · GAO report

U.S. Department of Agriculture: Additional Data Analysis Could Enhance Monitoring of U.S. Cattle Market (GAO-18-296)

Evidence of this effect alone does not imply that packers engaged in anticompetitive or improper behavior.

GAO modeled 2013-2015 fed cattle transactions. Fed cattle prices in less concentrated areas (HHI at the 25th percentile) may have been about 9 percent higher than in more concentrated areas (75th percentile). GAO found competition levels did not appear to affect the national price change in 2015, reports that the CFTC found no evidence of trading irregularities in cattle futures in 2015, and recommended that USDA review whether Packers and Stockyards staff can get daily transaction data.

Source: U.S. Government Accountability Office
Date: April 2018
Quoted from: p. 16
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-18-296.pdf
Accessed: 2026-11-09
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

Exhibit 611 · CRS report

Recent Acquisitions of U.S. Meat Companies (CRS Report RS22980)

On October 20, 2008, DOJ and 13 states filed a complaint in U.S. District Court to block the JBS buyout of National Beef Packing Company, citing concerns that it could contribute to higher consumer prices and also lower producer prices.

Records that DOJ and 13 states sued on 20 October 2008 to block JBS from buying National Beef and that DOJ declined to challenge JBS buying Smithfield Beef. ERS (EIB-256, p. 35) records that JBS then dropped the National Beef purchase.

Source: Congressional Research Service (Renee Johnson)
Date: 30 October 2008
Quoted from: Abstract, p. 1
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://stuff.mit.edu/afs/sipb.mit.edu/contrib/wikileaks-crs/wikileaks-crs-reports/RS22980.pdf
Accessed: 2026-11-09
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit
Note: The copy read is a WikiLeaks mirror of the CRS report.

Exhibit 636 · Agency report

Competition and Agriculture: Voices from the Workshops on Agriculture and Antitrust Enforcement in our 21st Century Economy and Thoughts on the Way Forward

Participants offered varied—and at times contradictory—accounts of the problems they face and the solutions they envision.

Reports on the 2010 DOJ-USDA workshops (opening remarks by Assistant Attorney General Christine Varney, 12 March 2010). Lists recurring themes including market concentration, merger enforcement, monopsony, bid rigging, market manipulation, captive supply and contracting; says the Division "has redoubled its efforts to prevent anticompetitive agricultural mergers and conduct."

Source: DOJ Antitrust Division
Date: May 2012
Quoted from: p. 1
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/283291.pdf
Accessed: 2026-11-09
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

5.3 The Packers and Stockyards rules

Finding AGR-5.3Primary record

USDA rules defining unfair practices under the Packers and Stockyards Act were proposed in 2010, limited by a 2011 appropriations rider, issued in 2016, withdrawn in 2017, finalized in 2020, expanded in 2024 and, for broiler grower payments, delayed in 2026 to December 31, 2027. Administrations and Congresses of both parties acted at each step, and White Houses of both parties described meat processing as insufficiently competitive in January 2022 and September 2026.

The record is documented in the Federal Register notices and the 2011 appropriations act listed below. The 2022 and 2026 White House documents are administration statements and not agency findings.

Evidence: Exhibit 612, Exhibit 613, Exhibit 614, Exhibit 615, Exhibit 616, Exhibit 617, Exhibit 618, Exhibit 619, Exhibit 620, Exhibit 621

Rules under the Packers and Stockyards Act, 2010 to 2026
Date	Action	Administration and Congress
22 June 2010	GIPSA proposes Title XI rules describing conduct that violates the Act (75 FR 35338)	Obama
18 Nov 2011	Pub. L. 112-55, sec. 721, bars funds for most of the proposal unless combined annual cost does not exceed $100 million	House Republican, Senate Democratic; signed by Obama
9 Dec 2011	GIPSA finalizes part and states other provisions “are not being finalized at this time”	Obama
20 Dec 2016	Interim final rule: some violations of sections 202(a) and (b) need no showing of harm to competition (81 FR 92566)	Obama
18 Oct 2017	GIPSA withdraws that interim rule for “serious legal and policy concerns” (82 FR 48594)	Trump
11 Dec 2020	Final rule on undue and unreasonable preferences, effective 11 Jan 2021 (85 FR 79779)	Trump
6 Mar 2024	Inclusive Competition and Market Integrity rule, effective 6 May 2024 (89 FR 16092)	Biden
1 June 2026	Broiler grower payment rule of 16 Jan 2025 (90 FR 5146) delayed from 1 July 2026 to 31 Dec 2027 (91 FR 32314)	Trump; notice cites Congress’s explanatory statement to Pub. L. 119-37

§5.3.1

The reasons stated in the documents differ by step. The 2011 rider uses a cost threshold. The 2017 withdrawal cites decisions of the Fifth, Sixth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits and others that require proof of competitive harm, and it states that the 2016 rule’s good-cause justification for skipping notice and comment was inadequate. The 2020 rule is described by its drafters as implementing a 2008 Farm Bill requirement and states that its criteria “are not safe harbors.” Commenters on it said it left the Act “largely unenforceable for individual farmers and ranchers.” The 2026 delay cites the explanatory statement and more than 2,800 comments.

§5.3.2

The documents do not say who sought the 2011 rider. As of 9 November 2026, no Federal Register document published after 20 January 2025 rescinds the 2024 rule.

§5.3.3

The January 2022 White House fact sheet states that four large packers “control 85 percent of the beef market” and that the Act “was systematically weakened by the Trump Administration USDA.” It commits $1 billion in American Rescue Plan funds to independent processing capacity. The fact sheet also gives a farmer share of the consumer beef dollar of over 60 cents fifty years earlier and about 39 cents then, and states no source for it.

§5.3.4

Executive Order 14424 of 4 September 2026 states a purpose to help ranchers “avoid being overcharged by monopolistic practices by meat processors.” It directs USDA to prioritize and expand Packers and Stockyards Act investigations, add staff and coordinate with DOJ under the 26 September 2025 memorandum of understanding on agricultural inputs. Section 4(c) states that it creates no enforceable rights.

Exhibit 612 · Federal Register proposed rule

Implementation of Regulations Required Under Title XI of the Food, Conservation and Energy Act of 2008; Conduct in Violation of the Act (75 FR 35338)

The new regulations that GIPSA is proposing would describe and clarify conduct that violates the P&S Act and allow for more effective and efficient enforcement by GIPSA.

Obama-administration USDA proposal to describe conduct that violates the Packers and Stockyards Act. Only some provisions were finalized on 9 December 2011 (76 FR 76874), which said the "Other provisions listed in the June 22, 2010, proposed rule are not being finalized at this time."

Source: USDA Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration
Date: 22 June 2010
Quoted from: Federal Register abstract (Summary)
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2010-06-22/pdf/2010-14875.pdf
Accessed: 2026-11-09
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

Exhibit 613 · Statute

Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. 112-55, Division A, sec. 721

None of the funds made available by this or any other Act may be used to write, prepare, or publish a final rule or an interim final rule in furtherance of, or otherwise to implement,

Appropriations rider barring funds to write, prepare or publish a final or interim final rule implementing 75 FR 35338 unless the combined annual cost to the economy did not exceed $100,000,000, and barring funds for named proposed sections (201.2(l), 201.2(t), 201.2(u), 201.3(c), 201.210, 201.211, 201.213, 201.214). Enacted in an appropriations act that passed a Congress controlled by both parties (House Republican, Senate Democratic) and was signed by President Obama.

Source: U.S. Congress
Date: 18 November 2011
Quoted from: Div. A, sec. 721
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-112publ55/html/PLAW-112publ55.htm
Accessed: 2026-11-09
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit
Note: Who sought the rider is not documented here; lobbying disclosures or committee records would be needed before a lobbying tag.

Exhibit 614 · Federal Register interim final rule

Scope of Sections 202(a) and (b) of the Packers and Stockyards Act (81 FR 92566)

This interim final rule reiterates USDA's longstanding interpretation that not all violations of the P&S Act require a showing of harm or likely harm to competition.

Obama-administration interim final rule clarifying that conduct can violate sections 202(a) and (b) without a finding of harm or likely harm to competition. Withdrawn on 18 October 2017.

Source: USDA Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration
Date: 20 December 2016
Quoted from: Federal Register abstract (Summary)
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-12-20/pdf/2016-30424.pdf
Accessed: 2026-11-09
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

Exhibit 615 · Federal Register final rule (withdrawal)

Scope of Sections 202(a) and (b) of the Packers and Stockyards Act; withdrawal of interim final rule (82 FR 48594)

GIPSA is withdrawing the IFR because of serious legal and policy concerns related to its promulgation and implementation.

Trump-administration withdrawal. Cites decisions of the Fifth, Sixth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits and others requiring proof of competitive harm, and says the interim rule's good-cause justification for skipping notice and comment was inadequate.

Source: USDA Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration
Date: 18 October 2017
Quoted from: Section IV, first sentence
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-10-18/pdf/2017-22593.pdf
Accessed: 2026-11-09
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

Exhibit 616 · Federal Register final rule

Undue and Unreasonable Preferences and Advantages Under the Packers and Stockyards Act (85 FR 79779)

This final rule establishes a new regulation containing criteria the Secretary of Agriculture will consider when determining whether an undue or unreasonable preference or advantage has occurred in violation of the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921 (Act).

Trump-administration final rule (effective 11 January 2021) implementing a 2008 Farm Bill requirement. The preamble records commenters who said it left the Act "largely unenforceable for individual farmers and ranchers" because it did not restate that violations can occur without competitive injury, and says the listed criteria "are not safe harbors." The Biden White House later called the Act "systematically weakened by the Trump Administration USDA."

Source: USDA Agricultural Marketing Service
Date: 11 December 2020
Quoted from: Federal Register abstract (Summary)
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-12-11/pdf/2020-27117.pdf
Accessed: 2026-11-09
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

Exhibit 617 · Federal Register final rule

Inclusive Competition and Market Integrity Under the Packers and Stockyards Act (89 FR 16092)

The purpose of this rule is to promote inclusive competition and market integrity in the livestock, meats, poultry, and live poultry markets.

Biden-administration final rule (effective 6 May 2024) prohibiting undue prejudice and unjust discrimination on a prohibited basis, identifying retaliation as unjust discrimination, and identifying deceptive practices in contract formation, performance, termination and refusal. No later Federal Register action rescinding it was found in a search of documents published after 20 January 2025.

Source: USDA Agricultural Marketing Service
Date: 6 March 2024
Quoted from: Federal Register abstract (Summary)
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-03-06/pdf/2024-04419.pdf
Accessed: 2026-11-09
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

Exhibit 618 · Federal Register final rule (delay)

Poultry Grower Payment Systems and Capital Improvement Systems; Delay of Effective Date (91 FR 32314)

to allow time for further consideration of actions that may be taken regarding the disposition of the rule

Delays from 1 July 2026 to 31 December 2027 the effective date of the Biden-era rule published 16 January 2025 (90 FR 5146) on broiler grower tournament payments. The notice cites the explanatory statement to the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2026 (Pub. L. 119-37), which encouraged USDA to delay the rule, and describes more than 2,800 comments.

Source: USDA Agricultural Marketing Service
Date: 1 June 2026
Quoted from: Federal Register abstract (Summary)
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-06-01/pdf/2026-10880.pdf
Accessed: 2026-11-09
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

Exhibit 619 · White House fact sheet

FACT SHEET: The Biden-Harris Action Plan for a Fairer, More Competitive, and More Resilient Meat and Poultry Supply Chain

Four large meat-packing companies control 85 percent of the beef market.

Gives top-four shares of 85 percent (beef), 54 percent (poultry) and about 70 percent (pork). Commits $1 billion in American Rescue Plan funds to independent processing capacity, new Packers and Stockyards rules, a DOJ-USDA complaint portal and "Product of USA" labeling. States that ranchers got over 60 cents of each consumer beef dollar fifty years earlier against about 39 cents then (source of that figure not stated in the fact sheet). Says the Packers and Stockyards Act "was systematically weakened by the Trump Administration USDA." These are administration statements, not agency findings.

Source: The White House (Biden administration)
Date: 3 January 2022
Quoted from: Third paragraph
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/01/03/fact-sheet-the-biden-harris-action-plan-for-a-fairer-more-competitive-and-more-resilient-meat-and-poultry-supply-chain/
Accessed: 2026-11-09
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

Exhibit 620 · Executive order

Executive Order 14424: Promoting Fair Competition in Livestock Markets and Expanding Market Access for American Meat Producers (91 FR 57761)

avoid being overcharged by monopolistic practices by meat processors

Directs USDA to prioritize and expand Packers and Stockyards Act investigations, add staff, coordinate with DOJ under the 26 September 2025 memorandum of understanding, and report within 60 days; also directs steps to widen interstate sale of state-inspected meat and a guaranteed loan program for small and regional beef processors. Creates no enforceable rights (sec. 4(c)).

Source: The White House (Trump administration)
Date: 4 September 2026 (published 10 September 2026)
Quoted from: Sec. 1 (Purpose)
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/09/10/2026-18567/promoting-fair-competition-in-livestock-markets-and-expanding-market-access-for-american-meat
Accessed: 2026-11-09
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

Exhibit 621 · Memorandum of understanding

Memorandum of Understanding between the Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, and the Department of Agriculture: Cooperation with Respect to Strengthening Competition for Agricultural Inputs

committed to protecting American farmers from the burdens imposed by high and volatile input costs

Working-level MOU covering feed, fertilizer, fuel, seed, equipment and pesticides. DOJ announced it through a press release quoting Assistant Attorney General Abigail Slater (justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-and-usda-coordinate-protect-competition-agricultural-inputs).

Source: DOJ Antitrust Division and USDA
Date: 26 September 2025
Quoted from: Paragraph 2
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.justice.gov/atr/media/1415501/dl
Accessed: 2026-11-09
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

5.4 The plea, the acquittals and the verdict

Finding AGR-5.4Primary record

Pilgrim's Pride pleaded guilty to a conspiracy to fix prices and rig bids for broiler chicken products and was sentenced to a criminal fine of $107,923,572 on February 23, 2021. ERS reports that individual defendants in the DOJ broiler cases were acquitted in jury trials. Tyson's filing states that the first civil broiler antitrust jury trial ended in a verdict for the defendants.

DOJ’s press release of 23 February 2021 states that Pilgrim’s “is the first company to plead guilty for its role in a conspiracy to fix prices and rig bids for broiler chicken products.” ERS’s summary of the DOJ chicken cases states that “individual defendants were acquitted in jury trials.”

Evidence: Exhibit 626, Exhibit 608, Exhibit 629

§5.4.1

The plea concerned a conspiracy “from as early as 2012 and continuing at least into 2017” that affected at least $361 million in Pilgrim’s sales, in the District of Colorado. Ten executives and employees at broiler producers had been charged. Pilgrim’s Pride is about 83 percent owned by JBS S.A.

§5.4.2

Pilgrim’s Pride pleaded guilty as a company. None of the cited documents states DOJ’s reasons for dropping charges against other individuals. The acquittals are as ERS summarizes them.

§5.4.3

Tyson’s Form 10-Q for the quarter ended 27 June 2026 states that Tyson self-reported to DOJ in June 2020 and received conditional leniency in August 2021. The same filing describes the first broiler antitrust jury trial, brought by direct purchasers between 12 September and 25 October 2023, as ending in a verdict for the defendants. Plaintiffs in the civil cases allege a conspiracy beginning in January 2008 for broilers. The verdict is a result in one case, and the settlements in section 5.5 are separate outcomes in the same litigation.

Exhibit 626 · Press release

One of the Nation's Largest Chicken Producers Pleads Guilty to Price Fixing and is Sentenced to a $107 Million Criminal Fine (Press Release 21-172)

Pilgrim’s is the first company to plead guilty for its role in a conspiracy to fix prices and rig bids for broiler chicken products.

Pilgrim's Pride pleaded guilty in D. Colo. and was sentenced to a criminal fine of $107,923,572 for a conspiracy "from as early as 2012 and continuing at least into 2017" affecting at least $361 million in its sales. Ten executives and employees at broiler producers had been charged.

Source: DOJ Antitrust Division
Date: 23 February 2021
Quoted from: Paragraph beginning "Pilgrim’s is the first company"
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/one-nation-s-largest-chicken-producers-pleads-guilty-price-fixing-and-sentenced-107-million
Accessed: 2026-11-09
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

Exhibit 629 · SEC periodic report

Tyson Foods, Inc., Form 10-Q for the quarter ended 27 June 2026 (Contingencies: Broiler, Pork and Beef Antitrust Litigation; DOJ civil investigative demands)

While we do not admit any liability as part of the settlements

Broiler classes: aggregate $221.5 million, final approvals June 2021 to April 2022; first broiler trial (direct purchasers, September-October 2023) ended in a verdict for the defendants without Tyson. Tyson self-reported to DOJ and received conditional leniency in August 2021. Pork: Tyson agreed to $50 million (direct), $85 million (consumer indirect) and $48 million (commercial and institutional indirect). Beef: $55 million (consumer indirect, paid 26 November 2025), $80 million plus $2.5 million expenses (direct), $47 million (commercial and institutional indirect, paid 2 June 2026); court granted certain class certification motions on 16 July 2026; Tyson has received civil investigative demands from DOJ about its beef business. Plaintiffs allege conspiracies from January 2008 (broilers), January 2009 (pork) and about January 2015 (beef).

Source: Tyson Foods, Inc. (SEC filing)
Date: 3 August 2026
Quoted from: Note "Commitments and Contingencies," Broiler Antitrust Civil Litigation, "Settlements"
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/100493/000010049326000058/tsn-20260627.htm
Accessed: 2026-11-09
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

5.5 Class settlements

Finding AGR-5.5Primary record

Tyson has agreed to class settlements of $221.5 million in the broiler case, $183 million in the pork case and $182 million in the beef case, and states that it does not admit liability. JBS USA settled three beef classes for $161.0 million and three pork classes for $57.3 million, and Pilgrim's Pride settled three broiler classes for $195.5 million.

Tyson’s Form 10-Q states: “While we do not admit any liability as part of the settlements.” JBS S.A.’s Form 20-F for fiscal 2024 reports its settlement amounts and states that it continues to defend the remaining classes. The JBS and Pilgrim’s note does not say whether those companies admit liability.

Evidence: Exhibit 629, Exhibit 630

Class settlements reported in company filings
Company	Case	Amount	Status stated in the filing
Tyson	Broiler	$221.5 million	Three settlements, final approvals June 2021 to April 2022
Tyson	Pork	$183 million	$50 million direct, $85 million consumer indirect, $48 million commercial and institutional indirect; approval differs by class
Tyson	Beef	$182 million	$80 million direct (plus $2.5 million expenses), $55 million consumer indirect (paid 26 Nov 2025), $47 million commercial and institutional indirect (paid 2 June 2026)
JBS USA	Beef	$161.0 million	$77.5 million paid in 2023; $83.5 million unpaid at 31 Dec 2024 pending court approval
JBS USA	Pork	$57.3 million	Three certified classes, paid 2021
Pilgrim’s Pride	Broiler	$195.5 million	Three certified classes, paid 2021

§5.5.1

The plaintiffs allege conspiracies beginning in January 2008 (broilers), January 2009 (pork) and about January 2015 (beef). The class settlements resolve those claims for the settling defendants. Tyson states that it has “valid and meritorious defenses” and settled “to avoid the uncertainty, risk, expense and distraction of protracted litigation.”

§5.5.2

JBS’s filing also records broiler opt-out settlements recognized at $582.5 million through 2024, of which $512.2 million was paid, and a broiler grower class settlement of $100.0 million with final approval on 7 January 2025. The table excludes both. Cargill is privately held, and no primary document in the record gives its settlement amounts.

Exhibit 630 · SEC annual report

JBS S.A., Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended 31 December 2024 (Legal proceedings: Broiler, Pork and Beef Antitrust Litigation)

JBS USA has settled with three of the purported classes in the U.S. Beef Antitrust Litigation, for an aggregate amount of US$161.0 million

JBS USA: three beef classes settled for $161.0 million aggregate ($77.5 million paid 2023, $83.5 million unpaid at 31 December 2024 pending court approval); three pork classes $57.3 million, paid 2021. Pilgrim's Pride (about 83 percent owned by JBS): three broiler classes $195.5 million, paid 2021; broiler opt-out settlements recognized $582.5 million through 2024 with $512.2 million paid; grower class $100.0 million (final approval 7 January 2025). JBS says it continues to defend the remaining classes.

Source: JBS S.A. (SEC filing)
Date: 26 March 2025
Quoted from: Item 8, Legal Proceedings, "Beef Antitrust Litigation"
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1450123/000101376225002376/ea0234555-20f_jbssa.htm
Accessed: 2026-11-09
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

5.6 Agri Stats

Finding AGR-5.6Primary record

DOJ sued Agri Stats in September 2023, alleging that its information exchanges among meat processors reduced competition. In May 2026 DOJ filed a proposed settlement that would end Agri Stats' company-level and facility-level production, cost and labor reports.

DOJ’s complaint in United States v. Agri Stats, Inc., No. 0:23-cv-03009 (D. Minn.), alleges Sherman Act section 1 violations through information exchanges in broiler chicken, pork and turkey.

Evidence: Exhibit 627, Exhibit 628

§5.6.1

The proposed settlement of 7 May 2026 was filed with California, Minnesota, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Utah. If the court approves it, Agri Stats must stop providing sales reports and non-public pricing information, stop reporting company-level or facility-level production, cost and labor data, offer most other information to buyers on reasonable terms and report to a court-approved monitor. Its subsidiary Express Markets may continue its price reports.

§5.6.2

The release says “As alleged in the complaint” that the exchange reduced competition. Acting Assistant Attorney General Omeed A. Assefi is quoted: “When companies decide certain information is too sensitive to share with the broader market, but not too sensitive to share with their closest competitors, that is a significant red flag that competition is being harmed.”

Exhibit 628 · Press release

Justice Department Requires Agri Stats to End Exchange of Competitively Sensitive Information Among Nation's Largest Meat Processors (Press Release 26-453)

When companies decide certain information is too sensitive to share with the broader market, but not too sensitive to share with their closest competitors, that is a significant red flag that competition is being harmed

Proposed settlement filed in D. Minn. with California, Minnesota, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Utah. If approved, Agri Stats must stop providing sales reports and non-public pricing information, stop reporting company- or facility-level production, cost and labor data, offer most other information to buyers on reasonable terms, and report to a court-approved monitor. The release says "As alleged in the complaint" the exchange reduced competition; the company's subsidiary Express Markets may continue its price reports.

Source: DOJ Antitrust Division and Office of the Attorney General
Date: 7 May 2026
Quoted from: Paragraph beginning "Agri Stats is a data-sharing and consulting company" (Acting Assistant Attorney General Omeed A. Assefi)
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-requires-agri-stats-end-exchange-competitively-sensitive-information
Accessed: 2026-11-09
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

5.7 Beef: certification and the DOJ investigation

Finding AGR-5.7Primary record

On July 16, 2026 the District of Minnesota certified four classes in the beef antitrust litigation, and the Eighth Circuit has agreed to review that certification. National Beef disclosed that DOJ told it in September 2025 that it was closing the federal investigation of fed cattle and beef packing markets, and that DOJ opened a new civil antitrust investigation in November 2025.

The disclosure appears in the Form 10-Q of U.S. Premium Beef, LLC for the quarter ended 26 September 2026, which describes National Beef Packing Company. It reads: “In September 2025, NBP received notice from the DOJ that it was closing the federal investigation, and then in November 2025 the DOJ initiated a new civil antitrust investigation.”

Evidence: Exhibit 631, Exhibit 629, Exhibit 622

§5.7.1

National Beef does not file with the SEC, so the disclosure is its minority owner’s. The 10-Q states that National Beef is subject to a DOJ and roughly 30 state attorney general investigation of fed cattle and beef packing markets. It states that on 16 July 2026 the District of Minnesota certified four classes (fed-cattle sellers, direct purchasers, commercial and institutional indirect purchasers, and consumer indirect purchasers) and denied two, and that the Eighth Circuit granted review under Rule 23(f). National Beef states that it “believes it has meritorious defenses.”

§5.7.2

Tyson’s 10-Q states that the court granted certain class certification motions on 16 July 2026 and that Tyson has received civil investigative demands from DOJ about its beef business. The USPB filing also records that on 28 September 2026 DOJ filed a statement of interest objecting to pending wage-fixing settlements for lack of injunctive relief.

§5.7.3

Neither filing gives a reason for closing or reopening the investigation, and National Beef’s filing does not say whether the closed matter is the one that began in 2020. In May 2020 nineteen senators of both parties asked DOJ to investigate “suspected price manipulation and anticompetitive behavior in the highly concentrated cattle industry.” The letter reports that live cattle prices had fallen more than 18 percent since February while wholesale beef rose as much as 115 percent, and it relays a 5 May 2020 request from eleven state attorneys general.

Exhibit 622 · Congressional letter

Letter from 19 U.S. Senators to Attorney General William Barr requesting a DOJ investigation of the cattle industry

request that the DOJ investigate suspected price manipulation and anticompetitive behavior in the highly concentrated cattle industry

Signed by Republican and Democratic senators (including Doug Jones, Tina Smith and Tammy Baldwin). Reports that live cattle prices fell more than 18 percent from February while wholesale beef rose as much as 115 percent, and relays a 5 May 2020 request from eleven state attorneys general.

Source: U.S. Senators (Fischer, Crapo, Daines, Jones, Enzi, Rounds, Hoeven, Smith, Cramer, Hyde-Smith and others)
Date: 12 May 2020
Quoted from: Paragraph 1
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.hydesmith.senate.gov/sites/default/files/2020-05/051220-DOJ%20Packers%20Investigation%20Request%20-%20Final.pdf
Accessed: 2026-11-09
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

Exhibit 631 · SEC periodic report

U.S. Premium Beef, LLC, Form 10-Q for the quarter ended 26 September 2026 (Note 10, Legal Proceedings, describing National Beef Packing Company)

In September 2025, NBP received notice from the DOJ that it was closing the federal investigation, and then in November 2025 the DOJ initiated a new civil antitrust investigation.

USPB holds an interest in National Beef (NBP). NBP discloses that it is subject to a DOJ and roughly 30 state attorney general investigation of fed cattle and beef packing markets; on 16 July 2026 the District of Minnesota certified four classes (fed-cattle sellers, direct purchasers, commercial and institutional indirect purchasers, consumer indirect purchasers) and denied two; the Eighth Circuit granted Rule 23(f) review; NBP "believes it has meritorious defenses"; on 28 September 2026 DOJ filed a statement of interest objecting to pending wage-fixing settlements for lack of injunctive relief.

Source: U.S. Premium Beef, LLC (SEC filing)
Date: 6 November 2026
Quoted from: Note 10, Legal Proceedings
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1289237/000168316826008383/uspb_i10q-092626.htm
Accessed: 2026-11-09
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit
Note: National Beef does not file with the SEC; this is its minority owner's disclosure.

5.8 Statements by the President and the Acting Attorney General

Finding AGR-5.8Reported

According to Reuters, President Trump said on 7 November 2025 that he had asked DOJ to investigate beef packers, and Attorney General Pam Bondi replied that an investigation was underway. According to Capital Press, Acting Attorney General Todd Blanche announced antitrust investigations of meatpacking on 4 May 2026.

Press reports quote both statements.

Evidence: Exhibit 624, Exhibit 625, Exhibit 623

§5.8.1

Reuters reports that the President posted on 7 November 2025 that he had asked DOJ to investigate “the Meat Packing Companies who are driving up the price of Beef through Illicit Collusion, Price Fixing, and Price Manipulation,” and that Attorney General Pam Bondi replied on X that an investigation was underway. The words “collusion,” “price fixing” and “price manipulation” are the speaker’s allegation.

§5.8.2

Capital Press reports that on 4 May 2026 Acting Attorney General Todd Blanche announced antitrust investigations of meatpacking, said that more than three million documents had been reviewed, and described whistleblower awards of up to 30 percent for criminal penalties above $1 million. DOJ lists the event on its site as a video titled “Acting Attorney General Blanche Announces Antitrust Investigations on Meatpacking Operations.”

§5.8.3

The new civil investigation in section 5.7 began in November 2025, and the National Beef filing gives no reason for it. No document cited links the request to the reopening. DOJ has said that criminal and civil inquiries often run in parallel and declined to say whether the probe is mainly criminal, according to press reports. None of the cited reports describes charges.

Exhibit 624 · Journalism

US Justice Department probes meatpackers, attorney general says (Reuters, via U.S. News)

Reports that President Trump posted on 7 November 2025 that he had asked DOJ to investigate "the Meat Packing Companies who are driving up the price of Beef through Illicit Collusion, Price Fixing, and Price Manipulation," and that Attorney General Pam Bondi replied on X that an investigation was underway. NBC News and Farm Policy News (University of Illinois) report the same events.

Source: Reuters
Date: 7 November 2025
Grade: Reported
Document: https://money.usnews.com/investing/news/articles/2025-11-07/trump-says-he-asked-doj-to-investigate-meat-packing-companies-for-driving-up-beef-prices
Accessed: 2026-11-09
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

Exhibit 625 · Journalism

U.S. attorney general probing beef packers seeks tips from ranchers (Capital Press)

Reports the 4 May 2026 announcement by Acting Attorney General Todd Blanche of antitrust investigations of meatpacking, with more than three million documents reviewed and whistleblower awards of up to 30 percent for criminal penalties above $1 million. DOJ lists the event on its site as the video "Acting Attorney General Blanche Announces Antitrust Investigations on Meatpacking Operations" (4 May 2026).

Source: Capital Press
Date: 5 May 2026
Grade: Reported
Document: https://capitalpress.com/2026/05/05/u-s-attorney-general-probing-beef-packers-seeks-tips-from-ranchers/
Accessed: 2026-11-09
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

Exhibit 623 · Trade association statement

Meat Institute Issues Statement on Beef Processing Sector DOJ Investigation

Despite high consumer prices for beef, beef packers have been losing money because the price of cattle is at record highs,

Industry position: packers are operating at a loss because cattle prices are at record highs, and the industry welcomes a "fact-based discussion about beef affordability." A position statement, not evidence of packer margins.

Source: North American Meat Institute
Date: 7 November 2025
Quoted from: Paragraph 2
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://mail.meatinstitute.org/node/917
Accessed: 2026-11-09
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit
Note: Date taken from search-result metadata; the page copy read does not print the date.

5.9 What no court has decided

Finding AGR-5.9Open question

The filings cited record no court decision on whether the largest beef packers fixed prices or manipulated cattle prices.

The three filings cited record a class certification order, settlements without admission and open investigations in beef, and no verdict or judgment on the merits.

Evidence: Exhibit 631, Exhibit 629, Exhibit 630

§5.9.1

The beef cases are In re Cattle and Beef Antitrust Litigation (D. Minn. MDL No. 0:20-md-02998) and its related matters. Tyson’s 10-Q states that the next pork trial in In re Pork Antitrust Litigation (D. Minn. No. 0:18-cv-01776) was set for September 2026. Hormel’s 10-Q reports a summary judgment motion in the pork case.

§5.9.2

The record holds the following: a guilty plea by one poultry processor, individual acquittals and a defense verdict in chicken, settlement payments with the settling companies’ stated non-admission, and allegations in beef and pork that have not reached a verdict in the filings cited.

5.10 Seed shares

Finding AGR-5.10Primary record

Two seed companies accounted for 72 percent of planted U.S. corn acres and 66 percent of soybean acres in 2018-20. USDA's 2023 seed competition report counts Bayer, Corteva, ChemChina and BASF as owning 95 percent of corn, 84 percent of soybean and 74 percent of cotton plant intellectual property.

ERS Table 1 (p. 11) gives the corn and soybean shares from proprietary industry data (GfK Kynetec and Farm Journal). USDA’s 2023 report counts plant variety protection certificates and patents that mention crop names in their titles or abstracts. Those counts are not shares of seed sales.

Evidence: Exhibit 608, Exhibit 632

§5.10.1

The USDA report states: “Today, the top four (Bayer, Corteva, ChemChina and BASF) own 97% of canola, 95% of corn, 84% of soybean, 51% of wheat, and 74% of cotton IP” (p. 42). For corn, the top four owned 41 percent of that intellectual property in 1990 and 77 percent in 2000. Government agencies generally do not collect seed sales shares, and the cotton series ended after 2020.

§5.10.2

The report’s executive summary states that “business developments arising from multiple decades of mergers and acquisitions have led to an increasingly consolidated marketplace” (p. 3). It also records that “many commenters agreed that a system that fairly protects IP is critical to continued innovation and investment in seed systems” (p. 4). ERS records the merging firms’ case that “firms needed greater scale to invest in and support research.”

Exhibit 632 · Agency report

More and Better Choices for Farmers: Promoting Fair Competition and Innovation in Seeds and Other Agricultural Inputs

Today, the top four (Bayer, Corteva, ChemChina and BASF) own 97% of canola, 95% of corn, 84% of soybean, 51% of wheat, and 74% of cotton IP.

Biden-administration report. Executive summary (p. 3) says "business developments arising from multiple decades of mergers and acquisitions have led to an increasingly consolidated marketplace," and records that "Many commenters agreed that a system that fairly protects IP is critical to continued innovation and investment in seed systems" (p. 4). Its own analysis (p. 42; Appendix B) counts plant variety protection certificates and patents mentioning crop names in the title or abstract from 1970 to 2022. For corn, the top four owned 41 percent in 1990 and 77 percent in 2000.

Source: USDA Agricultural Marketing Service (with USPTO), report under Executive Order 14036
Date: March 2023
Quoted from: p. 42 of 86
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/SeedsReport.pdf
Accessed: 2026-11-09
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

5.11 Three mergers and their divestitures

Finding AGR-5.11Primary record

In 2017 and 2018 antitrust agencies cleared ChemChina-Syngenta, Dow-DuPont and Bayer-Monsanto only with divestitures. DOJ called the roughly $9 billion Bayer divestiture to BASF the largest merger divestiture ever required by the United States.

The divestitures were required by the FTC (ChemChina-Syngenta, April 2017, to American Vanguard for paraquat, abamectin and chlorothalonil, as ERS records it) and by DOJ (Dow-DuPont, 15 June 2017; Bayer-Monsanto, 29 May 2018).

Evidence: Exhibit 634, Exhibit 633, Exhibit 608, Exhibit 635

§5.11.1

DOJ and the attorneys general of Iowa, Mississippi and Montana sued to enjoin Dow-DuPont and filed a settlement requiring divestiture of DuPont’s Finesse and Rynaxypyr crop protection products and two petrochemical products, for a merger valued at about $130 billion. DOJ required Bayer to divest about $9 billion in businesses and assets to BASF, including cotton, canola, soybean and vegetable seed businesses, the Liberty herbicide business, seed treatment businesses, pipeline research and the digital agriculture business, as a condition of its $66 billion purchase of Monsanto. DOJ states that without the divestitures the merger “would likely result in higher prices, lower quality, and fewer choices.” The merger closed in June 2018.

§5.11.2

In its comments on the Bayer-Monsanto decree, Syngenta, a competitor, said the remedy “remedies many of the most complex and difficult anticompetitive aspects of the transaction.” A former FTC remedies official called the divestiture “as robust a divestiture as might be imagined.” The attorneys general of California, Iowa, Massachusetts, Mississippi and Oregon, the Natural Resources Defense Council and the Consumer Federation of America said BASF might not replace Bayer as a competitor, and the Consumer Federation argued that the merged firm should have divested stronger assets (84 FR 1493).

§5.11.3

This section covers only the 2018 merger and the DOJ decree for Bayer and Monsanto. The glyphosate review authorship, litigation and lobbying record is in Medicine: MED-4.5 to MED-4.7 (review authorship and the 2015 public relations plan), MED-5.4 to MED-5.7 (Monsanto Co. v. Durnell, the Solicitor General’s reversal, the vacated EPA evaluation and the 2026 actions), MED-6.4 (Bayer’s 2025 lobbying) and Chapter 8 for the human, animal and exposure studies. Agriculture cites that record without restating it.

Exhibit 634 · Press release

Justice Department Secures Largest Merger Divestiture Ever to Preserve Competition Threatened by Bayer's Acquisition of Monsanto (Press Release 18-698)

the largest merger divestiture ever required by the United States

DOJ required Bayer to divest businesses and assets of about $9 billion to BASF as a condition of its $66 billion purchase of Monsanto, including cotton, canola, soybean and vegetable seed businesses, the Liberty herbicide business, seed treatment businesses, pipeline R&D and the digital agriculture business. Says that without the divestitures the merger "would likely result in higher prices, lower quality, and fewer choices."

Source: DOJ Antitrust Division
Date: 29 May 2018
Quoted from: Paragraph 2 (Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim)
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/justice-department-secures-largest-merger-divestiture-ever-preserve-competition-threatened
Accessed: 2026-11-09
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

Exhibit 633 · Press release

Justice Department Requires Divestiture of Certain Herbicides, Insecticides, and Plastics Businesses in Order to Proceed with Dow-Dupont Merger

will require The Dow Chemical Company (Dow) and E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. (DuPont) to divest multiple crop protection and two petrochemical products to proceed with their proposed merger valued at about $130 billion

DOJ, with the Iowa, Mississippi and Montana attorneys general, sued to enjoin the merger and filed a settlement requiring divestiture of DuPont's Finesse and Rynaxypyr crop protection products and two petrochemical products.

Source: DOJ Antitrust Division
Date: 15 June 2017
Quoted from: Paragraph 1
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-requires-divestiture-certain-herbicides-insecticides-and-plastics
Accessed: 2026-11-09
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

5.12 No retrospective study

Finding AGR-5.12Open question

No retrospective study of the Bayer-Monsanto divestiture's effect on competition has been located.

The comment of the state attorneys general in DOJ’s response to public comments (84 FR 1497) asked the court to “order a retrospective study of the effects of the merger on competition two years after transfer of the divestiture assets has begun.”

Evidence: Exhibit 635

§5.12.1

The case is United States v. Bayer AG et al., No. 1:18-cv-01241 (D.D.C.). The record contains no DOJ retrospective on the divestiture.

Exhibit 635 · Federal Register notice

United States v. Bayer AG et al.; Response to Public Comments (84 FR 1493)

order a retrospective study of the effects of the merger on competition two years after transfer of the divestiture assets has begun

Case No. 1:18-cv-01241 (D.D.C.). Commenters included five state attorneys general (California, Iowa, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Oregon), NRDC, the Consumer Federation of America and Syngenta. Syngenta said the decree "remedies many of the most complex and difficult anticompetitive aspects of the transaction"; a former FTC remedies official said the divestiture "appears to be as robust a divestiture as might be imagined"; the Consumer Federation argued the merged firm should have divested stronger assets. Entry date of the final judgment not found.

Source: DOJ Antitrust Division
Date: 4 February 2019
Quoted from: 84 FR 1497 (comment of the State Attorneys General)
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-02-04/html/2019-00810.htm
Accessed: 2026-11-09
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

5.13 Seed prices

Finding AGR-5.13Primary record

The average price farmers paid for seed rose 270 percent from 1990 to 2020, against 56 percent for commodity prices and 463 percent for crops grown mostly with genetically modified traits. ERS states that the evidence is mixed on whether concentration caused the rise.

ERS (p. 15) states that the evidence on whether concentration raised seed prices is mixed. It records that “increases in seed prices reflected to a large degree the higher productivity of improved crop varieties.”

Evidence: Exhibit 608

§5.13.1

ERS cites an OECD study (2018) that found no significant correlation between concentration and seed prices for field crops. It states that productivity gains “more than paid for the higher cost of seed.” It cites Ciliberto and coauthors (2019) for more than $5 billion a year in value from genetically modified traits, with 44 percent kept by farmers and 56 percent by seed companies.

§5.13.2

The 270 percent rise in seed prices is a price series. ERS states that the evidence is mixed on whether concentration caused the rise.

5.14 Patent exhaustion and repair

Finding AGR-5.14Primary record

The Supreme Court held unanimously in Bowman v. Monsanto (2013) that patent exhaustion does not let a farmer reproduce patented seed by planting and harvesting without the patent holder's permission. The FTC and five states sued Deere in January 2025 alleging it withheld repair tools, and in July 2026 filed a proposed settlement requiring Deere to give farmers and independent repair shops the repair resources it gives dealers for ten years.

The Court’s syllabus states: “Patent exhaustion does not permit a farmer to reproduce patented seeds through planting and harvesting without the patent holder’s permission.” The FTC release states: “By withholding these repair capabilities, the complaint alleged Deere unlawfully acquired and maintained monopoly power in markets for repair services for Deere farm equipment.”

Evidence: Exhibit 637, Exhibit 638

§5.14.1

In Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 569 U.S. 278 (2013), an Indiana farmer bought commodity soybeans from a grain elevator, planted them and saved seed from the Roundup Ready progeny for eight crops. The district court awarded Monsanto $84,456, and the Court affirmed. The Court called its holding “limited” and reasoned that a contrary rule would leave the patent with “scant benefit.” The decision did not address seed prices or concentration. It stands for the rule that bars replanting patented seed.

§5.14.2

The FTC and the attorneys general of Illinois, Arizona, Michigan, Minnesota and Wisconsin sued Deere in the Northern District of Illinois in January 2025, under the Biden administration. The proposed stipulated order of 8 July 2026, announced with a 2-0 Commission vote, requires Deere for ten years to give farmers and independent repairers repair resources equivalent to those it gives dealers. The order is a settlement. The allegations were not adjudicated.

Exhibit 637 · Court opinion

Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 569 U.S. 278 (2013), No. 11-796

Patent exhaustion does not permit a farmer to reproduce patented seeds through planting and harvesting without the patent holder’s permission.

Argued 19 February 2013. Indiana farmer Vernon Bowman bought commodity soybeans from a grain elevator, planted them, and saved seed from the Roundup Ready progeny for eight crops. The district court awarded Monsanto $84,456. The Court affirmed and said its holding was "limited" to the situation before it. The Court reasoned that a contrary rule would leave Monsanto's patent with "scant benefit."

Source: Supreme Court of the United States (Kagan, J., unanimous)
Date: 13 May 2013
Quoted from: Syllabus, Held
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/11-796_c07d.pdf
Accessed: 2026-11-09
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

Exhibit 638 · Press release

FTC, States Secure Settlement with Deere & Company, Advancing Farmers' Right to Repair

By withholding these repair capabilities, the complaint alleged Deere unlawfully acquired and maintained monopoly power in markets for repair services for Deere farm equipment.

The FTC and Illinois, Arizona, Michigan, Minnesota and Wisconsin sued Deere in January 2025 (N.D. Ill.). The proposed stipulated order requires Deere, for ten years, to give farmers and independent repairers repair resources equivalent to those it gives dealers. Commission vote 2-0. A settlement, not a finding.

Source: Federal Trade Commission
Date: 8 July 2026
Quoted from: Paragraph 5
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2026/07/ftc-states-secure-settlement-deere-company-advancing-farmers-right-repair
Accessed: 2026-11-09
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

5.15 AGRA and the Tufts working paper

Finding AGR-5.15Primary record

The Gates and Rockefeller foundations announced AGRA in September 2006 with a first investment of $150 million, $100 million of it from Gates, for the Program for Africa's Seed Systems. A July 2020 Tufts University working paper, not peer reviewed and supported by the Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, reported maize yields up 29 percent over 12 years, staple crop yields up 18 percent and undernourishment up 30 percent in AGRA's 13 countries.

The Gates Foundation’s September 2006 announcement states: “The Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa’s first investment of $150 million ($100 million from the Gates Foundation and $50 million from the Rockefeller Foundation) will support the Program for Africa’s Seed Systems (PASS).” The Tufts paper’s abstract states: “We find little evidence of widespread progress on any of AGRA’s goals.”

Evidence: Exhibit 639, Exhibit 640

§5.15.1

The program’s planned budget was $43 million for breeding, $20 million for training, $24 million for seed delivery, $37 million for agro-dealers and $26 million for management and evaluation. The working paper, GDAE Working Paper 20-01 from the Global Development and Environment Institute at Tufts, estimates that AGRA has received about $1 billion, two-thirds of it from the Gates Foundation. Later Gates grants to AGRA are not included in the $100 million above.

§5.15.2

The working paper is an assessment by one research group. It was not peer reviewed, and the research was supported by the Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, which also published the advocacy report False Promises built on it. The paper used national FAO and World Bank data because, it states, AGRA declined to provide its monitoring and evaluation data. AGRA states that it has a monitoring system (section 5.16). No peer-reviewed assessment of AGRA’s yield outcomes was located.

Exhibit 639 · Foundation press release

Bill & Melinda Gates, Rockefeller Foundations Form Alliance to Help Spur "Green Revolution" in Africa

The Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa’s first investment of $150 million ($100 million from the Gates Foundation and $50 million from the Rockefeller Foundation) will support the Program for Africa’s Seed Systems (PASS).

Announces the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa. PASS budget: $43 million breeding, $20 million training, $24 million seed delivery, $37 million agro-dealers, $26 million management and evaluation.

Source: Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation
Date: September 2006
Quoted from: Paragraph beginning "The Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa’s first investment"
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://gatesfoundation.org/media-center/press-releases/2006/09/foundations-form-alliance-to-help-spur-green-revolution-in-africa
Accessed: 2026-11-09
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit
Note: Day of month not shown in the page copy read.

Exhibit 640 · University working paper

Failing Africa's Farmers: An Impact Assessment of the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (GDAE Working Paper 20-01)

We find little evidence of widespread progress on any of AGRA’s goals

Uses national FAO and World Bank data because AGRA declined to provide its monitoring and evaluation data. Reports maize yields up 29 percent over 12 years, staple crop yields up 18 percent, and FAO undernourishment up 30 percent in AGRA's 13 countries; AGRA received about $1 billion, two-thirds from the Gates Foundation. A working paper that was not peer reviewed; the research was supported by the Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung (note 1), which also published the NGO report "False Promises."

Source: Global Development and Environment Institute, Tufts University (Timothy A. Wise)
Date: July 2020
Quoted from: Abstract, p. 1
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://bpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/sites.tufts.edu/dist/0/5123/files/2020/07/20-01_Wise_FailureToYield.pdf
Accessed: 2026-11-09
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit
Note: Not peer reviewed. Grade is primary because the exhibit is the issuer's own document; the text must say it is an assessment by one research group, not an adjudication.

5.16 AGRA’s reply

Finding AGR-5.16Reported

AGRA answered critics in 2020 that the Tufts undernourishment analysis was "deeply flawed," that its headline goals had not changed, and that it is "not involved in loan schemes."

The letter is AGRA’s written answer to six questions from African civil society organizations. It states: “Our headline goals have not changed. We do aspire to double incomes and yields, and would very much like to see this happen.”

Evidence: Exhibit 642

§5.16.1

The letter disputes the undernourishment finding and relies on the Global Hunger Index. It says AGRA has supported more than 110 seed companies. It says the paper’s author did not seek comment before publication and that yield data from AGRA’s outcome panel surveys will come at the end of its strategy. The critics’ reply of 7 October 2020 states that AGRA offered no evidence of impact on yields, incomes or food security.

§5.16.2

The letter is hosted by an advocacy organization, and its printed date of 1 September 2020 precedes the 7 September request it answers. The letter is dated 2020 here.

Exhibit 642 · Correspondence

Letter from Andrew Cox, AGRA Chief of Staff and Strategy, to PELUM-Zambia, BIBA-Kenya and HOMEF (with the 7 September 2020 request and the 7 October 2020 reply)

Our headline goals have not changed. We do aspire to double incomes and yields, and would very much like to see this happen

AGRA's written answer to the African organizations' six questions. The critics' 7 October reply says AGRA offered no evidence of impact. Several figures in the PDF text layer are garbled and are not used.

Source: Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (as published by U.S. Right to Know)
Date: 2020 (letter printed as 1 September 2020)
Quoted from: Cox letter, section "What are AGRA's goals and are we achieving them? What about yields?"
Grade: Reported
Document: https://usrtk.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Correspondence-BIBA-and-AGRA-accountability.pdf
Accessed: 2026-11-09
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit
Note: Hosted by an advocacy organization. The printed date (1 September 2020) precedes the 7 September request it answers, so the true date needs checking.

5.17 AGRA and seed laws

Finding AGR-5.17Open question

Whether AGRA-backed seed-law reforms restrict farmers' rights to save and exchange seed is not established by a primary document.

The advocacy report False Promises (July 2020) says AGRA documents its seed policy work with the stated goal of “seed policy and regulatory reforms that enable investment and growth of private sector seed businesses.” It says AGRA supported seed policy reforms aligned with the African Regional Intellectual Property Organization (ARIPO) in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Nigeria and Tanzania.

Evidence: Exhibit 641

§5.17.1

The report states that rules of the 1991 UPOV type limit farmers’ rights to save, exchange and sell seed. It also states that documentation of AGRA’s policy work is scant and that other initiatives pushed the same reforms. No primary document on those laws or on AGRA’s role in them is in the record.

Exhibit 641 · NGO report

False Promises: The Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA)

Documentation on AGRA’s policy initiatives is scant although it claims some credit for assisting in the passing of policy reforms and regulations that advance the Green Revolution agenda.

Advocacy report built on Wise's working paper. On p. 10 it says AGRA documents its seed policy work in a report with the stated goal of "seed policy and regulatory reforms that enable investment and growth of private sector seed businesses," that AGRA supported ARIPO-aligned seed policy reforms in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Nigeria and Tanzania, and that UPOV 1991-type rules limit farmers' rights to save, exchange and sell seed. It says documentation of AGRA's policy work is scant and that other initiatives pushed the same reforms.

Source: Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, INKOTA-netzwerk, PELUM Zambia, BIBA-Kenya, IRPAD, TABIO and others
Date: July 2020
Quoted from: RLS, False Promises: AGRA, section on AGRA's policy initiatives, PDF p. 12 (register gives p. 10 as printed)
Grade: Reported
Document: https://www.rosalux.de/fileadmin/rls_uploads/pdfs/Studien/False_Promises_AGRA_en.pdf
Accessed: 2026-11-09
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

5.18 The Gates Trust’s Monsanto shares

Finding AGR-5.18Primary record

The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation Trust reported 500,000 Monsanto shares in each quarterly Form 13F from June 2010 through September 2011, 0.2 percent of the value of the positions it listed at June 30, 2010.

The Trust’s Form 13F-HR for the quarter ended 30 June 2010, filed 16 August 2010, lists 31 positions worth $11,853,345 thousand in total. The Monsanto row reads: “MONSANTO CO NEW COM 61166W101 23,110 500,000 SH SOLE 500,000.”

Evidence: Exhibit 643

§5.18.1

The same 500,000 shares appear in the filings for 30 September 2010 ($23,965 thousand), 31 December 2010 ($34,820 thousand), 31 March 2011 ($36,130 thousand), 30 June 2011 ($36,270 thousand) and 30 September 2011 ($30,020 thousand). Monsanto does not appear in the filings for 31 December 2009, 31 March 2010 or 31 December 2011.

§5.18.2

The filing shows a holding and its value. It does not state a reason for the holding, and it does not connect the holding to any grant. The Trust’s holding is a separate record from the AGRA grants in section 5.15.

Exhibit 643 · SEC Form 13F

Form 13F-HR, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation Trust, quarter ended 30 June 2010

MONSANTO CO NEW COM 61166W101 23,110 500,000 SH SOLE 500,000

The information table lists 31 positions worth $11,853,345 thousand in total, including 500,000 shares of Monsanto Co. valued at $23,110 thousand (0.2 percent of the table). The same 500,000 shares appear in the 13F filings for 30 September 2010 ($23,965 thousand), 31 December 2010 ($34,820 thousand), 31 March 2011 ($36,130 thousand), 30 June 2011 ($36,270 thousand) and 30 September 2011 ($30,020 thousand). Monsanto does not appear in the filings for 31 December 2009, 31 March 2010 or 31 December 2011. Signed by Michael Larson as authorized agent.

Source: Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation Trust (SEC filing)
Date: 16 August 2010
Quoted from: Form 13F information table, Monsanto row
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166559/000104746910007567/a2199827z13f-hr.txt
Accessed: 2026-11-09
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit
Note: Whitespace in the table row collapsed. The filing shows a holding and its value, not the reason for it.

5.19 The Land Report’s acreage figure

Finding AGR-5.19Reported

The Land Report reported in January 2021 that Bill Gates held 268,984 acres in 19 states, 242,000 of them farmland, which is about 0.027 percent of the 896.6 million acres of U.S. land in farms in 2020.

The Land Report’s January 2021 newsletter states: “At No. 49, Microsoft co-founder Bill Gates joins the Class of 2020 with 268,984 acres in 19 states.” USDA’s National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) reports total U.S. land in farms in 2020 at 896,600,000 acres.

Evidence: Exhibit 644, Exhibit 645, Exhibit 646

§5.19.1

The acreage is the Land Report research team’s estimate. The newsletter places the largest concentrations in Louisiana (69,071 acres), Arkansas (47,927) and Nebraska (20,588). Some coverage says 18 states and the newsletter says 19. The 242,000 farmland acres are about 0.027 percent of the NASS total.

§5.19.2

The Land Report’s article “Farmer Bill” states that the research team estimated the 242,000 farmland acres after Cascade Investment’s 2017 purchase of 61 properties valued at about $500 million, and that most holdings are in Cascade entities. A Cascade spokesman declined to comment on the details “other than to say that Cascade is very supportive of sustainable farming.” The article states that the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation “has no ties whatsoever to Cascade or its investments.”

§5.19.3

The documents state no purpose for the holdings. Personal holdings and foundation programs are separate records, and the acreage supports no conclusion about either.

Exhibit 644 · Trade press

The Land Report Newsletter, January 2021 ("Bill Gates joins the Land Report 100")

At No. 49, Microsoft co-founder Bill Gates joins the Class of 2020 with 268,984 acres in 19 states.

Reports Gates at No. 49 on the Land Report 100 with 268,984 acres in 19 states, of which 242,000 acres are farmland, with the largest concentrations in Louisiana (69,071 acres), Arkansas (47,927) and Nebraska (20,588).

Source: The Land Report
Date: January 2021
Quoted from: p. 1
Grade: Reported
Document: https://landreport.com/newsletters/LR_Newsletter_January2021.pdf
Accessed: 2026-11-09
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit
Note: Grade reported per the never-publish list.

Exhibit 645 · Trade press

Farmer Bill (Eric O'Keefe, The Land Report)

A spokesman for Cascade Investment declined to comment on any of the details associated with these transactions or the Gateses’ holdings, other than to say that Cascade is very supportive of sustainable farming.

Says the Land Report 100 Research Team estimated 242,000 acres of farmland remained after Cascade Investment's 2017 purchase of 61 properties valued at about $500 million, and that most holdings are in Cascade entities managed by Michael Larson. States that "the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation has no ties whatsoever to Cascade or its investments."

Source: The Land Report
Date: 11 January 2021
Quoted from: Section "Sustainable Investing"
Grade: Reported
Document: https://landreport.com/2021/01/bill-gates-americas-top-farmland-owner/
Accessed: 2026-11-09
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

Exhibit 646 · Agency statistical report

Farms and Land in Farms: 2020 Summary

Total land in farms, at 896,600,000 acres, decreased 800,000 acres from 2019.

Total U.S. land in farms in 2020: 896.6 million acres across about 2.02 million farms. 242,000 acres is about 0.027 percent of that total.

Source: USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service
Date: February 2021
Quoted from: Summary, "Land in Farms"
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Todays_Reports/reports/fnlo0221.pdf
Accessed: 2026-11-09
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

Key findings

The four largest packers took 85 percent of steer and heifer slaughter and 67 percent of hog slaughter in 2019 (5.1).
ERS attributes the rise mainly to larger plants and says mergers played a limited role; GAO states that its 9 percent regional price estimate does not imply improper behavior (5.2).
The Packers and Stockyards rules were proposed, limited, withdrawn, finalized, expanded and delayed under administrations of both parties (5.3).
Pilgrim’s Pride pleaded guilty; individual executives were acquitted and the first broiler trial ended in a defense verdict (5.4).
Tyson, JBS USA and Pilgrim’s Pride settled class claims; Tyson states it does not admit liability (5.5).
DOJ sued Agri Stats in 2023 and proposed a settlement in 2026 (5.6).
A beef class was certified in July 2026, and DOJ closed and then reopened its beef investigation in 2025 (5.7).
The President’s November 2025 request and the Acting Attorney General’s May 2026 announcement are reported (5.8).
The filings cited record no decision on whether the largest beef packers fixed prices (5.9).
Two seed companies accounted for 72 percent of planted corn acres and 66 percent of soybean acres in 2018 to 2020 (5.10).
Three seed and chemical mergers cleared only with divestitures (5.11).
No retrospective study of the Bayer-Monsanto divestiture has been located (5.12).
Seed prices rose 270 percent from 1990 to 2020, and ERS says the evidence on cause is mixed (5.13).
The Supreme Court barred replanting patented seed, and the FTC and states settled with Deere over repair tools (5.14).
AGRA launched with $150 million in 2006, and a non-peer-reviewed Tufts paper reported little progress on its goals (5.15).
AGRA called the paper’s undernourishment analysis “deeply flawed” (5.16).
No primary document establishes how AGRA-backed seed laws affect seed saving (5.17).
The Gates Trust held 500,000 Monsanto shares, 0.2 percent of its reported positions, from 2010 to 2011 (5.18).
The Land Report reported 242,000 acres of farmland, about 0.027 percent of U.S. land in farms, with no stated purpose (5.19).

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