Exhibit 386

Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, S. Rpt. 108-301

Exhibit 386 · Congressional committee report

Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, S. Rpt. 108-301

either overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence reporting.

Phase I report. Conclusion 1: major key judgments of the Oct 2002 NIE overstated or unsupported. Conclusions 83 and 102: no evidence of pressure on analysts. Conclusions 85-87: the unclassified white paper dropped the estimate's caveats and dissenting agencies. Approved unanimously per additional views.

Source: U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Date: 9 July 2004
Quoted from: Conclusion 1, p. 14
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/publications/108301.pdf
Accessed: 2026-11-09
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit
Note: Conclusion 83 at p. 284; Conclusion 85 at p. 295.

Cited by

Finding DEF-2.4: Primary record The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reported unanimously in July 2004 that most major key judgments of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq "either overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence reporting." The Committee found no evidence that administration officials pressured analysts, and found that the CIA's unclassified white paper dropped the Estimate's caveats and its dissenting agencies.