Exhibit 1228 ยท Prize lecture (published in a peer-reviewed journal)
Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems (Nobel Prize Lecture, 8 December 2009; American Economic Review 100(3), 2010)
studies confirm that robust resource systems are characterized by most of the design principles and that failures are not.
Ostrom lists the design principles of long-enduring common-pool resource institutions (clear boundaries, congruent rules, collective choice, monitoring, graduated sanctions, conflict resolution, recognized rights, nesting) and reports that a review of over 100 studies found two-thirds confirm them, with some studies reading them too rigidly.
- Source
- Elinor Ostrom
- Date
- 8 December 2009
- Quoted from
- Section 4, printed p. 423 of the lecture as printed in Les Prix Nobel; the sentence begins on p. 422 ('Two-thirds of these') and the design-principle list is on p. 422
- Grade
- Peer-reviewed
- Document
- https://www.nobelprize.org/uploads/2018/06/ostrom_lecture.pdf
- Accessed
- 2026-11-10
- Cited by
- Findings citing this exhibit
- Note
- Ostrom credits the review to Cox, Arnold and Villamayor-Tomas (2009; Ecology and Society 2010). Evidence is about local common-pool resources such as fisheries, forests and irrigation, not national bureaucracies. Her footnote 5 says 'design principle' confused readers and that 'best practices' might have been the better term. The AER 'Beyond Markets and States' is this lecture. Governing the Commons (1990) was not read.