Exhibit 1231 ยท Peer-reviewed article (working paper read)
Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia (NBER Working Paper 11753, 2005; Journal of Political Economy 115(2):200-249, 2007)
announcing an increased probability of a government audit, from a baseline of 4 percent to 100 percent, reduced missing expenditures by about 8 percentage points
A randomized experiment in over 600 Indonesian village road projects. Announcing a government audit probability of 100 percent instead of a 4 percent baseline cut missing expenditures; increasing grass-roots monitoring had little overall effect.
- Source
- Benjamin A. Olken
- Date
- November 2005 (working paper); April 2007 (journal)
- Quoted from
- Abstract, NBER Working Paper 11753 (November 2005)
- Grade
- Peer-reviewed
- Document
- https://www.nber.org/papers/w11753
- Accessed
- 2026-11-10
- Cited by
- Findings citing this exhibit
- Note
- The text read is the NBER working paper; the JPE version (2007) should be checked for any change in wording or figures. One project type (village roads), one country, effect measured over the project, not over years.