Exhibit 1165 · Edited academic volume, chapter
Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis
cultural because it operates through a set of shared but not explicitly stated understandings about the world; capture because it can produce the same outcome as traditional capture – regulatory actions that serve the ends of industry.
Proposes three mechanisms by which regulators come to share an industry's view of the public interest: group identification, status and relationship networks. Applies them to pre-crisis U.S. financial regulation. Kwak says cultural capture is a channel alongside traditional capture and that in most cases it cannot be proved to be the determining factor. Chapter read in the Tobin Project proof (CUP pagination).
- Source
- James Kwak, in Carpenter and Moss (eds.), Preventing Regulatory Capture, Cambridge University Press, ch. 3 (pp. 71-98)
- Date
- 2014
- Quoted from
- p. 79 (same paragraph); "in most cases it will be impossible to prove that cultural capture is the determining factor behind regulatory outcomes", p. 79
- Grade
- Peer-reviewed
- Document
- https://www.tobinproject.org/sites/default/files/assets/Kwak%20-%20Cultural%20Capture%20and%20the%20Financial%20Crisis.pdf
- Accessed
- 2026-11-10
- Cited by
- Findings citing this exhibit
- Note
- Standing note: conceptual, little direct testing; Kwak concedes it is hard to identify empirically. Cite as a mechanism hypothesis only. Do not use it to attribute belief to named regulators.