The Lacuna Project

lacuna (n.) a gap in a record where something should be

Independent research. Not affiliated with any government, agency, or company.

Exhibit 699

Critics argued with our analysis of U.S. political inequality. Here are 5 ways they're wrong

Exhibit 699 · Authors' response (opinion essay)

Critics argued with our analysis of U.S. political inequality. Here are 5 ways they're wrong

Economic elites and interest groups can shape U.S. government policy — but Americans who are less well off have essentially no influence over what their government does.

The authors' own summary of their critics and replies. Concedes the 47/53 majority-win-rate figures from Bashir and Branham et al. Argues that slim majorities should not equal overwhelming ones. Using a 75 percent / 25 percent strong-support rule: when only the affluent strongly support a change it is adopted 46 percent of the time, when only the middle class strongly supports it 24 percent; when the affluent strongly oppose and the middle class does not, 4 percent; the reverse, 40 percent. With the other group held constant, strong affluent support raises adoption by about 25 points and strong middle-class support has no positive association. The authors say their 90th-percentile proxy may attribute to the affluent influence that belongs to the truly rich, citing Page, Bartels and Seawright.

Source
Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, The Washington Post (Monkey Cage), 23 May 2016
Date
23 May 2016
Quoted from
opening paragraph
Grade
Reported
Document
https://web.archive.org/web/2016/https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/23/critics-challenge-our-portrait-of-americas-political-inequality-heres-5-ways-they-are-wrong/
Accessed
2026-11-09
Cited by
Findings citing this exhibit
Note
Opinion essay by the study authors; the primary record is the dataset and Gilens 2015/2016 replies.

Cited by

Finding POL-2.4
Peer-reviewed In the 185 of 1,779 Gilens-Page cases where the median-income and affluent majorities took opposite sides, the median-income side got its preferred outcome 47 percent of the time and the affluent side 53 percent. Gilens and Page accept these figures.
Finding POL-2.5
Reported Gilens and Page report that when only the affluent strongly supported a change, at 75 percent support or 25 percent opposition, it was adopted 46 percent of the time, and when only the middle class strongly supported it, 24 percent of the time. When the affluent strongly opposed a change the middle class did not, adoption was 4 percent, and in the reverse case 40 percent.
Finding POL-2.15
Open question The Gilens-Page elite coefficient attaches to the 90th income percentile, about $146,000 in household income. No cited source measures the policy preferences of the top 1 percent across issues and years, so the effect cannot be assigned to the very rich.