Exhibit 693

Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens

Exhibit 693 · Peer-reviewed article

Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens

economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while average citizens and mass-based interest groups have little or no independent influence.

Tests four theories (Majoritarian Electoral Democracy, Economic-Elite Domination, Majoritarian Pluralism, Biased Pluralism) in one model on 1,779 survey-polled proposed policy changes, 1981-2002 (1,923 met four criteria; 1,779 also had income breakdowns, no constitutional amendment or Supreme Court ruling, and a clear adoption outcome). Preferences at the 50th income percentile stand for average citizens and at the 90th (about $146,000 household income in 2012 dollars) for economic elites; interest groups enter as a Net Interest-Group Alignment index built from the Fortune 'Power 25' lists plus ten high-lobbying industries. Outcome: whether the change was adopted within four years. Table 3, model 4: citizens .03 (not significant), elites .76, groups .56, R-squared .074. Table 2: citizen-elite preference correlation .78 after measurement-error correction; groups-citizens .04 (mass-based .12, business -.10). Table 4: mass-based groups .24, business groups .43, citizens .05. The authors call the test 'tentative and preliminary' (p. 564), state that their evidence 'does not indicate that in U.S. policy making the average citizen always loses out' (p. 572; see also p. 570), describe citizens as often 'coincidental beneficiaries' of elite wins (p. 573), report that narrow pro-change majorities got change about 30 percent of the time and 80 percent majorities about 43 percent (p. 573), and state the data cannot distinguish elite theories, cannot test non-economic elites, and cannot tell agenda blocking from rejection (pp. 574, 576). Journal pagination used for locators.

Source: Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Perspectives on Politics 12(3), pp. 564-581
Date: September 2014
Quoted from: Abstract, p. 564
Grade: Peer-reviewed
Document: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592714001595
Accessed: 2026-11-09
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

Cited by

Finding POL-2.1: Peer-reviewed Gilens and Page analyzed 1,779 survey-polled proposed policy changes from 1981 to 2002 and tested whether adoption within four years followed the preferences of the 50th income percentile, the preferences of the 90th income percentile, or a Net Interest-Group Alignment index. With all three in one model, the 50th-percentile coefficient was .03 and not significant, against .76 for the 90th percentile and .56 for interest groups.
Finding POL-2.2: Peer-reviewed In the Gilens-Page data the preferences of the 50th and 90th income percentiles correlate at .78 after measurement-error correction, and the model's R-squared is .074. The authors write that average citizens often get the policies they want as coincidental beneficiaries, and that their evidence does not indicate that the average citizen always loses out.
Finding POL-2.15: Open question The Gilens-Page elite coefficient attaches to the 90th income percentile, about $146,000 in household income. No cited source measures the policy preferences of the top 1 percent across issues and years, so the effect cannot be assigned to the very rich.
Finding POL-2.16: Open question The Gilens-Page data cannot show whether proposals the middle class favors and the affluent oppose fail by being kept off the agenda or by being voted down.