Exhibit 1164 ยท Edited academic volume, introduction
Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence and How to Limit It, Introduction
Regulatory capture is the result or process by which regulation, in law or application, is consistently or repeatedly directed away from the public interest and toward the interests of the regulated industry, by the intent and action of the industry itself.
Defines regulatory capture, separates strong from weak capture (strong capture is where no regulation or full replacement would serve the public better), says capture is a matter of degree and often overstated, and criticizes Stigler's inference from outcomes to purpose. Full introduction read (Tobin Project copy, pp. 1-17+).
- Source
- Daniel Carpenter and David A. Moss (eds.), Cambridge University Press / Tobin Project
- Date
- 2014
- Quoted from
- Introduction, p. 13 (definition). Strong vs. weak capture, p. 11; "Stigler's rather casual standard of causal inference has been uncritically embraced", p. 8; "Regulatory capture is not always and everywhere the devastating problem it is often made out to be", p. 2.
- Grade
- Peer-reviewed
- Document
- https://tobinproject.org/sites/tobinproject.org/files/assets/Introduction%20from%20Preventing%20Regulatory%20Capture.pdf
- Accessed
- 2026-11-10
- Cited by
- Findings citing this exhibit
- Note
- Standing note: robust definition and the best frame (capture by degrees); it is itself a corrective to overclaiming. Use its definition for any Lacuna sentence that says capture, including "by the intent and action of the industry", which excludes cases where no industry action is documented.