Members and Markets
Abstract
The STOCK Act of 4 April 2012 states that members of Congress and their staff owe a duty of trust over material nonpublic information and requires them to report each covered trade within 45 days. The penalty for a report more than 30 days late is a $200 fee that an ethics office may waive. In 2022 the House Committee on Ethics dismissed late-reporting referrals against two Republicans and one Democrat, and news reports state that the Justice Department closed inquiries into four Republican senators and one Democratic senator without charges in 2020 and January 2021. Studies of members' returns split. Two studies of the 1980s and 1990s and three of 2004 to 2010 found excess returns for purchases or for powerful members, and two studies of the same and later years found none. Results for the period after 2012 conflict. The only prosecutions in the record, of Representative Collins and former Representative Buyer, both Republicans, did not involve information obtained through congressional office. The House passed a trading bill on 22 July 2026, with Republicans 218-0 in favor and Democrats 13-198, and the Senate rejected cloture on 30 September 2026, with all 53 Republicans in favor and all 47 Democrats and Independents opposed. A disclosure record lists trades, dates and value ranges and contains no statement of what the filer knew or intended.
4.1 What the STOCK Act requires
The STOCK Act, signed 4 April 2012, states that members and employees of Congress owe a duty of trust and confidence over material nonpublic information derived from their positions, and requires each covered transaction to be reported within 30 days of notification and no later than 45 days after the transaction.
Section 4 of the Act adds a statement to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that each member or employee of Congress "owes a duty arising from a relationship of trust and confidence to the Congress, the United States Government, and the citizens of the United States with respect to material, nonpublic information derived from such person's position." Section 6 adds the reporting requirement to the Ethics in Government Act.
Evidence: Exhibit 741
The Act creates a duty statement and a reporting deadline. Section 4 affirms that members and employees are not exempt from insider trading law, and the Act's rule of construction preserves the SEC's authority and the antifraud provisions. A prosecution for trading on nonpublic information therefore runs through existing securities law, as it did in the Collins case in section 4.8.
Section 3 directs the House and Senate ethics committees to issue guidance that members and employees may not use nonpublic information for private profit. Section 7 ordered the GAO report discussed in section 4.10. Section 8 required public online posting of members' and staff's disclosure forms.
Exhibit 741 · Statute
Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012, Public Law 112-105 (S. 2038)
each Member of Congress or employee of Congress owes a duty arising from a relationship of trust and confidence to the Congress, the United States Government, and the citizens of the United States with respect to material, nonpublic information derived from such person's position as a Member of Congress or employee of Congress or gained from the performance of such person's official responsibilities.
Sec. 3 directs the House and Senate ethics committees to issue guidance that members and employees may not use nonpublic information for private profit. Sec. 4 affirms that members and employees are not exempt from insider trading law. Sec. 6 adds EIGA s.103(l): a report of each covered transaction within 30 days of notification and no later than 45 days after the transaction, for Members and congressional employees among others. Sec. 7 orders a GAO report on political intelligence. Sec. 8 required public online posting of members' and staff's disclosure forms and electronic filing within 18 months.
- Source
- U.S. Congress
- Date
- 4 April 2012
- Quoted from
- Sec. 4(b)(2), new s.21A(g)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 126 Stat. 292
- Grade
- Primary record
- Document
- https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-112publ105/html/PLAW-112publ105.htm
- Accessed
- 2026-11-09
- Cited by
- Findings citing this exhibit
A filer more than 30 days late owes a $200 fee that the supervising ethics office may waive in extraordinary circumstances, and each congressional ethics committee must refer to the Attorney General any individual it has reasonable cause to believe willfully failed to file.
The penalty provisions now sit in 5 U.S.C. 13106, codified by Public Law 117-286 on 27 December 2022. The Attorney General may seek a civil penalty of up to $50,000 for knowing and willful failure to file or falsification. Knowing and willful failure to file is a crime, and falsification carries a fine or up to one year.
Evidence: Exhibit 743
The $200 fee applies only after a 30-day grace period, and the statute allows the supervising ethics office to waive it. The statute directs each congressional ethics committee to refer a willful failure to file to the Attorney General. The ethics committees are committees of the chambers whose members file the reports.
4.2 Staff and online posting
Public Law 113-7, signed 15 April 2013, ended the online-posting requirement for congressional staff disclosure forms and kept it for members and candidates; staff remain subject to the reporting duty.
The Senate passed S. 716 on 11 April 2013 and the House on 12 April, and the President signed it as Public Law 113-7 on 15 April. It makes sections 8(a) and 11(a) of the STOCK Act "not be effective" except for forms filed by the President, Vice President, members, candidates and Senate-confirmed Level I and II officers.
Evidence: Exhibit 742, Exhibit 772
Congressional staff therefore remain subject to the reporting duty in section 6, and they file reports with the Clerk or the Secretary of the Senate. Their forms are not posted in the public databases. The amended section 8(b) limits the searchable electronic database to members and candidates and moves its deadline to 1 January 2014.
Roll Call reported on 11 April 2013 that the Senate passed the bill without committee action. Other outlets reported the stated rationale as a National Academy of Public Administration report on security risks of posting data and Office of Government Ethics support for delay. Public Citizen and outside security experts disputed that rationale.
Exhibit 742 · Statute
Public Law 113-7 (S. 716), modifying online access to financial disclosure statements under the STOCK Act
section 8(a) and section 11(a) of the STOCK Act (5 U.S.C. App. 105 note) shall not be effective.
Makes sections 8(a) and 11(a) of the STOCK Act ineffective except for forms filed by the President, Vice President, Members of Congress, candidates for Congress, and Senate-confirmed Level I and II officers. Amends section 8(b) so the electronic-filing and searchable-database requirement covers Members and candidates only, and moves the deadline from 18 months after enactment to 1 January 2014. Congressional staff therefore remain subject to the s.103(l) reporting duty but their forms are not posted in the public databases. Passed the Senate 11 April and the House 12 April 2013 (legislative history on the enrolled text).
- Source
- U.S. Congress
- Date
- 15 April 2013
- Quoted from
- Sec. 1(a)(1), 127 Stat. 438
- Grade
- Primary record
- Document
- https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-113publ7/html/PLAW-113publ7.htm
- Accessed
- 2026-11-09
- Cited by
- Findings citing this exhibit
4.3 Late reports in the House
The House Committee on Ethics charges $200 for a first late periodic transaction report, $200 per month of late transactions for the second through fourth, and $200 per late transaction from the fifth, and the Office of Congressional Ethics found in 2022 that the Committee had been inconsistent in assessing fines and that some members were never directed to pay.
The Office of Congressional Ethics (OCE) report on Representative Pat Fallon (R-TX) sets out the Committee on Ethics' fee schedule. The OCE states that "the Committee has been inconsistent in the manner in which it has calculated and assessed fines."
Evidence: Exhibit 744
The report states that some members were never directed to pay a fine. The OCE's published findings state that they do not determine whether a violation occurred. The OCE voted 5-0 to refer the Fallon matter to the Committee. It found substantial reason to believe that Fallon failed to file timely reports and that between January and December 2021 he failed to disclose 122 transactions on time. Fallon declined an interview.
Dollar amounts of fines paid are not public, and the OCE says so. The Committee stated that it was working to address the programmatic issues raised by the referrals. The cited documents record no published result.
Exhibit 744 · Congressional report
Office of Congressional Ethics Report and Findings, Review No. 21-3355 (Rep. Pat Fallon)
The OCE also found that the Committee has been inconsistent in the manner in which it has calculated and assessed fines.
The OCE Board voted 5-0 to refer, finding substantial reason to believe Rep. Fallon (R-TX) failed to file timely PTRs; between January and December 2021 he failed to timely disclose 122 transactions. Fallon's spokesperson attributed the lapse to unfamiliarity as a freshman member. Section II.B sets out the Committee's late-fee schedule ($200 for the first late PTR; $200 per month of late transactions for the 2nd to 4th; $200 per late transaction from the 5th) and states that the OCE found some members were never directed to pay a fine and that the Committee was inconsistent in assessing fines. Findings state they do not determine whether a violation occurred. Fallon declined an interview.
- Source
- Office of Congressional Ethics, U.S. House of Representatives
- Date
- Adopted 18 February 2022; transmitted 2 March 2022
- Quoted from
- Findings of Fact para. 29, p. 12
- Grade
- Primary record
- Document
- https://ethics.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/OCE-Report-and-Findings_10.pdf
- Accessed
- 2026-11-09
- Cited by
- Findings citing this exhibit
On 29 July 2022 the House Committee on Ethics unanimously dismissed referrals over late periodic transaction reports for Representatives Fallon (R) and Jacobs (R) and Suozzi (D), stating that there was not clear evidence the errors were knowing or willful.
The Chairman, Representative Deutch (D-FL), and the Ranking Member, Representative Walorski (R-IN), issued the 29 July 2022 statement jointly. It says the Committee "concluded that there was not clear evidence that the errors and omissions in the Members’ PTRs were knowing or willful and that the Members were generally unclear on the requirements relating to PTR filings."
Evidence: Exhibit 747, Exhibit 744, Exhibit 745, Exhibit 746, Exhibit 748
The OCE adopted its referrals on 18 February 2022 and transmitted them in the following weeks. Besides Fallon, Jacobs and Suozzi, the OCE referred Representative John Rutherford (R-FL) over late reports. The cited records do not state the Committee's disposition of that referral.
The members' explanations differ. Fallon's spokesperson attributed the lapse to unfamiliarity as a freshman. Suozzi told the OCE that all of his investments are managed by a broker and that his office misunderstood whether broker-managed trades required reports. The Committee said each member made remedial efforts. At the Committee on House Administration hearing of 7 April 2022, the Ranking Member, Representative Davis (R-IL), cited a press tally of members with reported violations and described the violations as probably inadvertent. The published tallies of late filers carry no stated method and changed between versions.
Exhibit 747 · Press release
Statement of the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Committee on Ethics regarding Reps. Fallon, Jacobs and Suozzi (Press Release 277)
The Committee concluded that there was not clear evidence that the errors and omissions in the Members’ PTRs were knowing or willful and that the Members were generally unclear on the requirements relating to PTR filings.
Chairman Deutch (D-FL) and Ranking Member Walorski (R-IN) announce that the Committee unanimously dismissed OCE referrals concerning two Republicans (Fallon, Jacobs) and one Democrat (Suozzi) over late PTRs, says each member made remedial efforts, and says the Committee is working to address programmatic issues raised by the referrals.
- Source
- Committee on Ethics, U.S. House of Representatives
- Date
- 29 July 2022
- Quoted from
- para. 2
- Grade
- Primary record
- Document
- https://ethics.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Press-Release_277.pdf
- Accessed
- 2026-11-09
- Cited by
- Findings citing this exhibit
Exhibit 745 · Congressional report
Office of Congressional Ethics Report and Findings, Review No. 21-6367 (Rep. Thomas Suozzi)
all of his investments are managed by a broker
OCE Board referral to the Committee on Ethics of allegations that Rep. Suozzi (D-NY) failed to file timely PTRs. Suozzi told the OCE his investments are managed by a broker and that his office had misunderstood whether broker-managed trades required PTRs. Published by the Committee under Committee Rule 17A with its 29 July 2022 dismissal statement.
- Source
- Office of Congressional Ethics, U.S. House of Representatives
- Date
- Adopted 18 February 2022; published 29 July 2022
- Quoted from
- Findings of Fact para. 44
- Grade
- Primary record
- Document
- https://ethics.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/OCE-Report-and-Findings_13.pdf
- Accessed
- 2026-11-09
- Cited by
- Findings citing this exhibit
- Note
- Quote is a fragment of para. 44; the sentence continues onto the next line of the report.
4.4 The Senate inquiries of 2020
News reports state that the Justice Department closed its inquiries into Senators Loeffler (R), Feinstein (D) and Inhofe (R) by 26 May 2020, Perdue (R) by 25 November 2020 and Burr (R) in January 2021 without charges. A letter released by Loeffler's spokesperson, whose authenticity the committee staff did not confirm, says the Senate Ethics Committee dismissed the matter on 16 June 2020, and Burr says the SEC took no action.
NBC reported on 26 May 2020 that aides said the Justice Department had ended its inquiries into Loeffler, Feinstein and Inhofe. CBS reported on 19 to 20 January 2021 that the Justice Department had closed its inquiry into Burr's sales of late January to mid-February 2020. Reuters, summarizing a New York Times report of 25 November 2020, reported that the Perdue inquiry, which concerned trades in Cardlytics, where he had served on the board, had been shut without charges.
Evidence: Exhibit 752, Exhibit 753, Exhibit 754, Exhibit 755, Exhibit 756
Roll Call reported a 16 June 2020 Senate Ethics Committee letter, supplied by a Loeffler spokesperson, stating that the committee "did not find evidence" of a violation and "has dismissed this matter." The committee's staff director did not confirm its authenticity to the reporter. The Perdue campaign cited a dismissal letter of the same date and released two sentences of it. The Senate Ethics Committee does not publish its dismissals.
According to a news report, Burr said in January 2023 that the SEC had taken no action. The cited records contain no SEC document and no SEC enforcement action against Burr. The FBI seized Burr's phone in May 2020, and he stepped down as chair of the Intelligence Committee.
The five senators are four Republicans and one Democrat. The sources for the closings are news reports of agency actions, and no agency or committee document is cited. No closing by the Justice Department, the SEC or the Senate Ethics Committee states its reasons.
Exhibit 752 · News report
Justice Department drops insider trading probes into three senators
Aides told NBC the Justice Department ended inquiries into Loeffler (R-GA), Feinstein (D-CA) and Inhofe (R-OK); the Burr inquiry continued. Loeffler's spokesman called it exoneration and the inquiry politically motivated; Feinstein's office said her assets were in a blind trust and her husband traded; Inhofe said he does not make his own trades; Burr said he relied solely on public news reports.
- Source
- NBC News
- Date
- 26 May 2020
- Grade
- Reported
- Document
- https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/justice-department-drops-insider-trading-probes-three-senators-n1215196
- Accessed
- 2026-11-09
- Cited by
- Findings citing this exhibit
- Note
- DOJ does not publish declinations. Read via summarizer.
Exhibit 754 · News report
Sen. Loeffler ethics inquiry dismissed
Reports a 16 June 2020 Senate Ethics Committee letter, supplied by a Loeffler spokesperson, saying the committee 'did not find evidence' the actions violated federal law, Senate rules or standards of conduct and 'has dismissed this matter'. The committee staff director did not confirm authenticity to the reporter. The Perdue campaign likewise cited a 16 June 2020 dismissal letter but released only two sentences.
- Source
- CQ Roll Call
- Date
- 16 June 2020
- Grade
- Reported
- Document
- https://rollcall.com/2020/06/16/sen-loeffler-ethics-inquiry-dismissed/
- Accessed
- 2026-11-09
- Cited by
- Findings citing this exhibit
- Note
- Primary would be the Senate Ethics Committee letters. Committee does not publish dismissals.
Burr said he relied solely on public news reports, Loeffler's spokesman called the inquiry politically motivated, Feinstein's office said her assets were in a blind trust and her husband traded, Inhofe said he does not make his own trades, and Perdue's campaign spokesman called the outcome 'exonerating evidence' and the allegations 'baseless accusations.'
The accounts the senators gave are reported secondhand. Burr said he relied solely on public news reports and asked the Ethics Committee to review the matter. Loeffler's spokesman called the inquiry politically motivated. Perdue's campaign spokesman called the outcome "exonerating evidence" and the allegations "baseless accusations."
Evidence: Exhibit 752, Exhibit 753, Exhibit 754, Exhibit 755
Feinstein's office said her assets were in a blind trust and that her husband traded. Inhofe said he does not make his own trades. Each account comes from the senator or the senator's office. The sale dates, amounts and owner codes in the Senate disclosure filings for these trades are not stated here.
4.5 Studies that found excess returns
A study of Senators' trades in 1993-1998 found that a portfolio copying their purchases beat the market by 85 basis points per month, and a study of House trades in 1985-2001 found that a portfolio copying their purchases beat it by 55 basis points per month.
Ziobrowski and colleagues studied Senators' common stock trades in 1993 to 1998 (Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, December 2004). They report that "a portfolio that mimics the purchases of U.S. Senators beats the market by 85 basis points per month, while a portfolio that mimics the sales of Senators lags the market by 12 basis points per month."
Evidence: Exhibit 761, Exhibit 762
The same method applied to more than 16,000 House transactions by about 300 members in 1985 to 2001 gave a smaller result (Business and Politics, April 2011). The abstract states that "a portfolio that mimics the purchases of House Members beats the market by 55 basis points per month (approximately 6% annually)."
Exhibit 761 · Peer-reviewed study
Abnormal Returns from the Common Stock Investments of the U.S. Senate
We document that a portfolio that mimics the purchases of U.S. Senators beats the market by 85 basis points per month, while a portfolio that mimics the sales of Senators lags the market by 12 basis points per month.
Studies Senators' common stock trades 1993-1998. Finds Senators' purchases beat the market and their sales lagged it.
- Source
- Ziobrowski, Cheng, Boyd and Ziobrowski, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 39(4):661-676
- Date
- December 2004
- Quoted from
- Abstract (via Crossref)
- Grade
- Peer-reviewed
- Document
- https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109000003161
- Accessed
- 2026-11-09
- Cited by
- Findings citing this exhibit
Exhibit 762 · Peer-reviewed study
Abnormal Returns From the Common Stock Investments of Members of the U.S. House of Representatives
A portfolio that mimics the purchases of House Members beats the market by 55 basis points per month (approximately 6% annually).
Applies the 2004 method to more than 16,000 House transactions by about 300 members, 1985-2001. House purchases earned positive abnormal returns, smaller than the Senate's.
- Source
- Ziobrowski, Boyd, Cheng and Ziobrowski, Business and Politics 13(1):1-22
- Date
- April 2011
- Quoted from
- Abstract (via Crossref)
- Grade
- Peer-reviewed
- Document
- https://doi.org/10.2202/1469-3569.1308
- Accessed
- 2026-11-09
- Cited by
- Findings citing this exhibit
- Note
- It found positive returns.
Karadas (2019) and Hall, Karadas and Schlosky (2017) found abnormal returns in members' trades in 2004-2010 concentrated among powerful members, and Karadas and Huang and Xuan (2018, a working paper on 2010-2013) found them absent after the 2012 Act.
Karadas (2019) studied trades in 2004 to 2010 and found that buy-minus-sell portfolios of powerful Republicans earned the highest abnormal returns and that the returns disappeared after the 2012 Act. Hall, Karadas and Schlosky (2017) found abnormal returns after election only for members on powerful committees. Huang and Xuan (2018, a working paper) found abnormal returns before the Act and none after.
Evidence: Exhibit 766, Exhibit 767, Exhibit 768
Hall and colleagues state that "these abnormal returns only accrue to those who serve on powerful committees," and that their pre-2012 data do not imply wrongdoing. Their evidence before election is weak and inconsistent. Huang and Xuan use the Act's passage as an experiment on 2010 to 2013 holdings and trades. The 2013 Eggers and Hainmueller paper in section 4.6 analyzed 2004 to 2008 and reached the opposite result for much of the same period.
The Karadas result is specific to powerful Republicans. The 2020 Belmont paper in section 4.7 reports the party split for the period after 2012: sales by Republican senators underperformed by 50 basis points over three months, and neither party's senators showed skill at buying.
Exhibit 766 · Peer-reviewed study
Trading on Private Information: Evidence from Members of Congress
I also find that the positive abnormal returns disappear after the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act was passed in 2012.
Members' trades 2004-2010. Buy-minus-sell portfolios of powerful Republicans earn the highest abnormal returns; the returns disappear after the 2012 STOCK Act.
- Source
- Serkan Karadas, The Financial Review 54(1):85-131
- Date
- January 2019
- Quoted from
- Abstract (EconPapers copy)
- Grade
- Peer-reviewed
- Document
- https://doi.org/10.1111/fire.12180
- Accessed
- 2026-11-09
- Cited by
- Findings citing this exhibit
4.6 Studies that found none
Eggers and Hainmueller (2013) found no information advantage in 1985-2001 or 2004-2008 and found that the average member's 2004-2008 portfolio would have earned more in an index fund, and Belmont and colleagues (2022) found no superior performance in 2012-2020, including among senators accused of informed trading.
Eggers and Hainmueller (Journal of Politics, April 2013) reinterpreted the 1985 to 2001 data, analyzed 2004 to 2008 trades and, in what they call the first analysis of members' portfolio holdings, found that "between 2004 and 2008 the average member of Congress would have earned higher returns in a passive index fund." Belmont and colleagues (Journal of Public Economics, March 2022) studied January 2012 to December 2020.
Evidence: Exhibit 763, Exhibit 765
Belmont and colleagues write: "We find no evidence of superior investment performance whether we look in aggregate or at Senators specifically accused of informed trading." The paper's tests are of portfolio performance in the aggregate and for the accused senators as a group.
Both studies are peer reviewed. Eggers and Hainmueller dispute the Ziobrowski results directly.
| Study | Period | Result | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ziobrowski et al. 2004 | 1993-98, Senate | Purchases beat the market by 85 bp per month | Peer reviewed |
| Ziobrowski et al. 2011 | 1985-2001, House | Purchases beat the market by 55 bp per month | Peer reviewed |
| Hall et al. 2017 | 2004-10 | Abnormal returns only for powerful committees | Peer reviewed |
| Karadas 2019 | 2004-10 | Highest for powerful Republicans; gone after 2012 | Peer reviewed |
| Huang and Xuan 2018 | 2010-13 | Abnormal returns before the Act, none after | Working paper |
| Eggers and Hainmueller 2013 | 1985-2001, 2004-08 | No information advantage; index fund beat the average member | Peer reviewed |
| Belmont et al. 2022 | 2012-20 | No superior performance | Peer reviewed |
| Belmont et al. 2020 | 2012-Mar 2020, Senate | No buying skill in either party; sales after 24 Jan 2020 briefing underperformed by 9% | NBER working paper |
| Chen and Sacerdote 2026 | 2012-23 | Portfolios underperform or at best match benchmarks | NBER working paper |
| Wei and Zhou 2025 | Leaders after ascension | 47 percentage points a year above matched peers | NBER working paper |
Exhibit 763 · Peer-reviewed study
Capitol Losses: The Mediocre Performance of Congressional Stock Portfolios
Second, we conduct the first analysis of members’ portfolio holdings, showing that between 2004 and 2008 the average member of Congress would have earned higher returns in a passive index fund.
Reinterprets the 1985-2001 studies, analyzes 2004-2008 trades, and analyzes portfolio holdings. Finds no information advantage in either period and lower returns than an index fund for the average member in 2004-2008.
- Source
- Eggers and Hainmueller, Journal of Politics 75(2):535-551
- Date
- April 2013
- Quoted from
- Abstract (LSE Research Online copy)
- Grade
- Peer-reviewed
- Document
- https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381613000194
- Accessed
- 2026-11-09
- Cited by
- Findings citing this exhibit
Exhibit 765 · Peer-reviewed study
Do senators and house members beat the stock market? Evidence from the STOCK Act
We find no evidence of superior investment performance whether we look in aggregate or at Senators specifically accused of informed trading.
Trades of senators and House members, January 2012 to December 2020. Finds no superior performance in aggregate or among senators accused of informed trading.
- Source
- Belmont, Sacerdote, Sehgal and Van Hoek, Journal of Public Economics 207:104602
- Date
- March 2022
- Quoted from
- Abstract (RePEc copy)
- Grade
- Peer-reviewed
- Document
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2022.104602
- Accessed
- 2026-11-09
- Cited by
- Findings citing this exhibit
4.7 The period after 2012
Studies of the period after 2012 disagree: Chen and Sacerdote (2026) find 2012-2023 portfolios underperform or at best match benchmarks, Belmont and colleagues (2020) report that stocks senators sold after the 24 January 2020 briefing underperformed the market by 9 percent, and Wei and Zhou (2025) find that lawmakers outperform peers by 47 percentage points a year after reaching party leadership.
Chen and Sacerdote (NBER Working Paper 35041, April 2026) cover all members and immediate families in 2012 to 2023. They find "that, on average, legislators' portfolios underperform or, at best, match market benchmarks after the STOCK Act," that positions track professional recommendations and that timing follows retail sentiment.
Evidence: Exhibit 770, Exhibit 764, Exhibit 769
Belmont and colleagues (NBER Working Paper 26975, April 2020) studied senators' trades from 2012 to March 2020. They report that stocks sold after the 24 January 2020 briefing "underperform the market by a statistically significant 9 percent while stocks purchased during this period underperform by 3 percent." Purchases overall slightly underperformed matched stocks, and no industry-specific skill tied to committees appeared.
Wei and Zhou (NBER Working Paper 34524, November 2025) report that "lawmakers who later ascend to leadership positions perform similarly to matched peers beforehand but outperform them by 47 percentage points annually after ascension." The authors attribute the result to political influence and corporate access channels.
The three papers use different samples and measures, and none is peer reviewed. Chen and Sacerdote find no advantage across all members. Wei and Zhou find a large one among leaders. Karadas and Huang and Xuan find that the pre-2012 returns they report ended with the Act, and Belmont and colleagues (2022) find none after it. The post-2012 record is open, and the grade on Finding POL-4.11 states that.
Exhibit 770 · Research paper (not peer reviewed)
Capital in the Capitol: Congressional Trades Resemble Uninformed Retail Trading (NBER Working Paper 35041)
We find that, on average, legislators’ portfolios underperform or, at best, match market benchmarks after the STOCK Act.
All members of Congress and immediate families, 2012-2023. Finds portfolios underperform or at best match benchmarks, positions track professional recommendations and timing follows retail sentiment.
- Source
- Chen and Sacerdote, NBER
- Date
- April 2026
- Quoted from
- Abstract
- Grade
- Primary record
- Document
- https://www.nber.org/papers/w35041
- Accessed
- 2026-11-09
- Cited by
- Findings citing this exhibit
Exhibit 769 · Research paper (not peer reviewed)
"Captain Gains" on Capitol Hill (NBER Working Paper 34524)
lawmakers who later ascend to leadership positions perform similarly to matched peers beforehand but outperform them by 47 percentage points annually after ascension.
Transaction-level data on congressional trades. Finds that lawmakers who later become party leaders match peers beforehand and outperform them afterward, which the authors attribute to political influence and corporate access channels.
- Source
- Wei and Zhou, NBER
- Date
- November 2025
- Quoted from
- Abstract
- Grade
- Primary record
- Document
- https://www.nber.org/papers/w34524
- Accessed
- 2026-11-09
- Cited by
- Findings citing this exhibit
Exhibit 764 · Research paper (not peer reviewed)
Relief Rally: Senators as Feckless as the Rest of Us at Stock Picking (NBER Working Paper 26975)
Stocks sold following the January 24th COVID-19 briefing do underperform the market by a statistically significant 9 percent while stocks purchased during this period underperform by 3 percent.
Senators' trades 2012 to March 2020. Purchases slightly underperform industry-and-size matched stocks; no industry-specific skill tied to committees; neither party's senators show skill at buying; sales by Republican senators underperform by 50 bp over three months; sales after the 24 January 2020 briefing underperform by 9 percent.
- Source
- Belmont, Sacerdote, Sehgal and Van Hoek, NBER
- Date
- April 2020
- Quoted from
- Abstract
- Grade
- Primary record
- Document
- https://www.nber.org/papers/w26975
- Accessed
- 2026-11-09
- Cited by
- Findings citing this exhibit
4.8 The two prosecutions
Two Republicans were prosecuted for insider trading: Christopher Collins (R-NY) pleaded guilty in 2019 over information from his seat on the board of Innate Immunotherapeutics, and former Representative Stephen Buyer (R-IN) was convicted in 2023 over information from his consulting work after he left Congress; neither case used information obtained through congressional office, and the cited records contain no Democratic counterpart.
The SEC alleged on 8 August 2018 that Collins, an independent director of Innate Immunotherapeutics, learned of negative clinical trial results for the company's multiple sclerosis drug and tipped his son Cameron, who sold shares before the announcement. Collins pleaded guilty in October 2019 to conspiracy to commit securities fraud and false statements and was sentenced on 17 January 2020 to 26 months.
Evidence: Exhibit 757, Exhibit 758, Exhibit 759, Exhibit 760
The SEC's litigation release of 9 December 2019 states that Collins consented to a permanent injunction under the antifraud provisions and an officer-and-director bar, and that Cameron Collins and Stephen Zarsky agreed to disgorge avoided losses. All three pleaded guilty to related criminal charges. The information came from Collins's corporate board role, not from his congressional office. Press accounts report that President Trump pardoned Collins in December 2020.
NBC reported that a jury convicted former Representative Stephen Buyer (R-IN) in March 2023 on four counts of securities fraud over trades in T-Mobile, Sprint and Navigant based on information from his consulting work, and that Judge Berman sentenced him to 22 months in September 2023. The trades were made after he left Congress.
Both defendants are Republicans, and neither case used information from a congressional position. The cited records contain no prosecution of a Democratic member or former member for insider trading.
Exhibit 757 · Press release
SEC Charges Congressman and Others in Insider Trading Scheme (Press Release 2018-151)
Christopher Collins, who served as an independent director of an Australian biotech company, Innate Immunotherapeutics Ltd., is charged with tipping Cameron Collins after receiving confidential information about negative clinical trial results for Innate’s multiple sclerosis drug.
SEC alleges Rep. Christopher Collins (R-NY), an independent director of Innate Immunotherapeutics, learned of negative clinical trial results for the company's MS drug and tipped his son Cameron, who sold shares before the announcement. The information came from his corporate board role, not from his office.
- Source
- U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
- Date
- 8 August 2018
- Quoted from
- SEC press release 2018-151, 8 Aug 2018, second paragraph
- Grade
- Primary record
- Document
- https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-151
- Accessed
- 2026-11-09
- Cited by
- Findings citing this exhibit
Exhibit 758 · Agency report
SEC Litigation Release No. 24687 (Collins, Collins, Zarsky settlements)
Christopher Collins consented to be permanently barred from acting as an officer or director of any public company.
Christopher Collins consented to a permanent injunction under the antifraud provisions and a permanent officer-and-director bar; Cameron Collins and Stephen Zarsky agreed to disgorge avoided losses ($634,299 and $159,880 per a secondary summary). All three pleaded guilty to related criminal charges.
- Source
- U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
- Date
- 9 December 2019
- Quoted from
- SEC Litigation Release LR-24687, 9 Dec 2019, paragraph beginning "The three defendants consented"
- Grade
- Primary record
- Document
- https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr-24687
- Accessed
- 2026-11-09
- Cited by
- Findings citing this exhibit
4.9 What a filing shows
A periodic transaction report signed 23 February 2024 under the name of Nancy Pelosi lists two spouse-owned transactions in Palo Alto Networks call options, on 12 February 2024 ($500,001 to $1,000,000) and 21 February 2024 ($100,001 to $250,000), filed within the 45-day window.
The House Clerk's public record of the report (Filing ID 20024542) shows owner code SP (spouse) for both transactions, each with a notification date equal to the transaction date. The first entry reads "Purchased 50 call options with a strike price of $200 and an expiration date of 1/17/25." The form certifies that all transactions required by the STOCK Act are disclosed.
Evidence: Exhibit 749
The filing records two trades, their dates, their value ranges and their owner. It does not record what the owner or the filer knew, why the trades were made or who decided to make them. The cited records contain no charge, court record or ethics finding concerning these trades.
Press reports state that Pelosi's office says she owns no stock and has no involvement in or prior knowledge of her husband's trades. On 15 December 2021 Pelosi told reporters that members of Congress should be able to participate in a free market economy and should report their trades, as CNBC reported the next day. On 30 July 2025 she issued a statement that she strongly supports the HONEST Act and expects to vote for it on the House floor.
Exhibit 749 · Financial disclosure
Periodic Transaction Report, Hon. Nancy Pelosi (CA-11), Filing ID 20024542
Purchased 50 call options with a strike price of $200 and an expiration date of 1/17/25.
Reports two transactions with owner code SP (spouse) in Palo Alto Networks (PANW) call options, 12 February 2024 ($500,001 to $1,000,000) and 21 February 2024 ($100,001 to $250,000), each with notification date equal to transaction date, filed within the 45-day window. The form certifies that all transactions required by the STOCK Act are disclosed. A disclosure record shows trades; it does not show intent or information.
- Source
- Clerk of the House of Representatives
- Date
- Signed 23 February 2024
- Quoted from
- p. 1, first transaction
- Grade
- Primary record
- Document
- https://disclosures-clerk.house.gov/public_disc/ptr-pdfs/2024/20024542.pdf
- Accessed
- 2026-11-09
- Cited by
- Findings citing this exhibit
4.10 Political intelligence
GAO reported in April 2013 that no law or ethics rule specifically governs the sale of political intelligence, that its prevalence is not known and is hard to quantify, and that materiality and timing are hard to determine.
Section 7 of the STOCK Act ordered the report, which GAO issued on 4 April 2013 as GAO-13-389. The report makes no recommendations.
Evidence: Exhibit 771
The report concerns what the Act calls political intelligence. GAO's title states that the financial market value of government information hinges on materiality and timing.
Exhibit 771 · GAO report
Political Intelligence: Financial Market Value of Government Information Hinges on Materiality and Timing (GAO-13-389)
There are no laws or ethics rules that specifically govern the sale of information by a political intelligence firm.
STOCK Act s.7 report. Finds no law or ethics rule specifically governs the sale of political intelligence, that its prevalence is not known and is hard to quantify, and that materiality and timing are hard to determine. Makes no recommendations.
- Source
- U.S. Government Accountability Office
- Date
- 4 April 2013
- Quoted from
- GAO-13-389 (April 2013), p. 5, section 'No Laws or Ethics Rules Specifically Govern Political Intelligence'
- Grade
- Primary record
- Document
- https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-13-389.pdf
- Accessed
- 2026-11-09
- Cited by
- Findings citing this exhibit
- Note
- Quote after reading.
4.11 The bills and the 2026 votes
Bills to restrict stock trading by members were heard in the House Administration Committee in April 2022, were not brought to a vote by the House Democratic leadership before the 2022 midterms, were advanced by the Senate Homeland Security Committee in July 2024 (8-4) and July 2025, and are supported by Pelosi as of 30 July 2025.
Representative Lofgren (D-CA) chaired the 7 April 2022 House Administration hearing. Democratic leaders asked the committee to draft a bill covering members, justices and spouses, and did not bring it to a vote before the midterms, according to Bloomberg News. Representative Spanberger (D) criticized the delay.
Evidence: Exhibit 748, Exhibit 773, Exhibit 774, Exhibit 775, Exhibit 751, Exhibit 750
Pelosi said on 15 December 2021 that members should be able to trade. Her 30 July 2025 statement supports the HONEST Act. The Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee voted 8-4 on 24 July 2024 to report a revised S. 1171, which bars members, spouses, dependents, the President and the Vice President from owning individual stocks and raises the $200 penalty to $500. The committee advanced S. 1498, the HONEST Act, by Senators Hawley (R) and Peters (D), on 30 July 2025, and reported it to the Senate on 10 December 2025.
The 2024 Senate text is Senator Merkley's (D) bill with changes by Hawley, Peters and others. The cited records show no House vote on a trading ban between 2022 and 2026.
Exhibit 773 · News report
Pelosi ripped by fellow Democrat for delaying stock-trade bill
Reports that House Democratic leaders, who had asked the House Administration Committee to draft a bill covering members, justices and spouses, did not bring it to a vote before the 2022 midterms; Rep. Spanberger criticized the delay. Insider later wrote that the ban 'ultimately died' in that Congress.
- Source
- Bloomberg via BNN
- Date
- 30 September 2022
- Grade
- Reported
- Document
- https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/pelosi-ripped-by-fellow-democrat-for-delaying-stock-trade-bill-1.1826373
- Accessed
- 2026-11-09
- Cited by
- Findings citing this exhibit
Exhibit 775 · Bill text
S. 1498, HONEST Act, reported in the Senate (Calendar No. 294)
This Act may be cited as the “Halting Ownership and Non-Ethical Stock Transactions (HONEST) Act”.
Committee-reported text of the Hawley-Peters bill. Per press reports, the committee advanced it on 30 July 2025; it bars members, the President and Vice President and spouses and dependents from holding or buying individual stocks.
- Source
- U.S. Senate, 119th Congress
- Date
- Reported 10 December 2025
- Quoted from
- S. 1498 as reported in the Senate (Calendar No. 294), committee amendment, Sec. 1
- Grade
- Primary record
- Document
- https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BILLS-119s1498rs/xhtml/BILLS-119s1498rs.html
- Accessed
- 2026-11-09
- Cited by
- Findings citing this exhibit
- Note
- Header read only; read the bill before use.
The House passed H.R. 7008 on 22 July 2026 by 232-198, with Republicans 218-0 and Democrats 13-198, and the Senate rejected cloture on 30 September 2026 by 53-47, with Republicans 53-0 and Democrats and Independents 0-47.
H.R. 7008, the Stop Insider Trading Act, passed the House in Roll Call 280 on 22 July 2026. In the Senate, cloture on the motion to proceed failed on 30 September 2026, with three-fifths required. Roll Call reported that the House bill bars members, spouses and dependent children from buying new stocks, requires 7 to 14 days' public notice before sale of existing holdings and sets penalties of $2,000 or 10 percent of the transaction.
Evidence: Exhibit 776, Exhibit 777, Exhibit 778
| Vote | Republicans | Democrats | Independents | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| House passage, 22 July (Roll 280) | 218 yea, 0 nay | 13 yea, 198 nay, 1 not voting | 1 yea | 232-198 |
| Senate cloture, 30 September (Vote 253) | 53 yea, 0 nay | 0 yea, 45 nay | 0 yea, 2 nay | 53-47 |
The House Administration chair, Representative Steil (R), sponsored the bill, and an added photo-ID provision drew objection. Representative Morelle (D) called it a poison pill, as Roll Call reported. The cited documents do not record why the Senate Democrats and Independents voted against cloture on the House text. The senators who voted for and against are in the Senate roll call, with party counts tallied from its member list.
The Senate committee's bills of 2024 and 2025 carry bipartisan sponsors. On the House text in 2026, every Republican voted yea in both chambers, and 198 House Democrats and all 45 Senate Democrats voted nay. Bloomberg reported that in 2022 the Democratic leadership of the House held a draft bill without a vote.
Exhibit 776 · Roll call vote
Roll call 280, H.R. 7008, Stop Insider Trading Act, On Passage
Passed 232-198. Republicans 218 yea, 0 nay. Democrats 13 yea, 198 nay, 1 not voting. Independent 1 yea.
- Source
- Clerk of the House of Representatives
- Date
- 22 July 2026
- Grade
- Primary record
- Document
- https://clerk.house.gov/evs/2026/roll280.xml
- Accessed
- 2026-11-09
- Cited by
- Findings citing this exhibit
Exhibit 777 · Roll call vote
Roll call vote 253, cloture on the motion to proceed to H.R. 7008
Cloture rejected 53-47, with 3/5 required. All 53 Republicans voted yea. All 45 Democrats and both Independents voted nay (party counts computed from the member list in the XML).
- Source
- U.S. Senate
- Date
- 30 September 2026
- Grade
- Primary record
- Document
- https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1192/vote_119_2_00253.xml
- Accessed
- 2026-11-09
- Cited by
- Findings citing this exhibit
4.12 Questions the sources leave open
Six questions remain open in the cited record. The first is why each inquiry in section 4.4 closed, which only a Justice Department declination letter, an SEC closing letter or a Senate Ethics Committee document would settle. The second is what the Senate transaction reports show for the 2020 sales. The third is the Committee on Ethics' disposition of the Rutherford referral and the amount of fines actually paid.
The fourth is whether the post-2012 results in section 4.7 converge, and whether the leadership result in Wei and Zhou holds in a peer-reviewed version. The fifth is how many members have filed late. The sixth is whether the political-intelligence market GAO could not measure in 2013 can now be measured.
Key findings
- The STOCK Act states a duty of trust over nonpublic information and requires reports within 45 days (4.1).
- Late reports carry a $200 fee that an ethics office may waive, and willful failures are referred to the Attorney General (4.2).
- The 2013 amendment ended online posting of staff forms and kept members' forms online (4.3).
- The Office of Congressional Ethics found the House Committee on Ethics inconsistent in assessing fines (4.4).
- The Committee dismissed referrals against two Republicans and one Democrat in 2022 (4.5).
- The Justice Department closed its 2020 inquiries into five senators without charges (4.6).
- The senators attribute their trades to public reports, advisers, blind trusts or spouses (4.7).
- Studies of 1985 to 2001 found excess returns on purchases of 55 to 85 basis points per month (4.8).
- Three studies found abnormal returns for powerful members in 2004 to 2010 and none after 2012 (4.9).
- Two peer-reviewed studies found no advantage in the periods they covered (4.10).
- Studies of the period after 2012 conflict (4.11).
- Both prosecutions found involved Republicans, and neither used information from congressional office (4.12).
- A 2024 report filed by Pelosi lists two spouse-owned options transactions; filings show trades, not information (4.13).
- GAO found in 2013 that no law specifically governs the sale of political intelligence (4.14).
- Trading bills reached committee votes in 2022, 2024 and 2025 without passing (4.15).
- The House passed H.R. 7008 on 22 July 2026 and the Senate rejected cloture on 30 September 2026, with Republicans in favor and nearly all Democrats opposed (4.16).